SMITH’S LAST STAND?
FREE EXERCISE AND FOSTER CARE EXCEPTIONALISM
*

James G. Dwyer

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia1 postpones the apparent inevitable—the
demise of Employment Division v. Smith2—with its deflationary view of the Free
Exercise Clause and return to application of heightened judicial scrutiny
even to laws neutral as to religion and of general applicability. In Fulton, the
Court held unanimously in favor of a Catholic agency the City had expelled
from its foster care system because of its refusal to certify same-sex couples,
but the majority found a way to reach that outcome without answering calls
to overturn Smith. Two Justices, in a concurring opinion authored by Justice
Barrett, signaled disapproval of Smith while also expressing uncertainty about
what should replace it.3 Three other Justices, in a concurring opinion
authored by Justice Alito, made clear their determination to overturn Smith
and begin applying strict scrutiny to any law “that imposes a substantial
burden on religious exercise.”4 They chided the majority for skirting the big
question of Smith’s survival by deciding the Philadelphia dispute on the basis
of facts the City can readily change (details of its contract with private
agencies and of its public accommodation law) and interpretations of state
and local law that Pennsylvania courts can readily override (applicability of
public accommodation law).5 Alito’s seventy-seven page concurrence reads
like an advance draft of a Fulton II majority opinion.

*
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Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. This Article greatly benefited
from input by Elizabeth Bartholet, Evan Criddle, Neal Devins, and Timothy Zick.
141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
494 U.S. 872 (1989).
141 S. Ct. at 1882–83 (Barrett, J., concurring).
Id. at 1924 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1887 (Alito, J., concurring). See also id. at 1930 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (likewise noting the
modifiability of state law interpretation, city ordinance, and contract and stating that “the majority's
course guarantees that this litigation is only getting started”). The majority held that the City’s
action fell outside the bounds of Smith because it rested on a) contractual non-discrimination
provisions that were, insofar as they allowed discretionary individual exceptions, not generally
applicable, and b) a local public accommodation ordinance, Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, § 91106, that should be construed as inapplicable to foster care, because foster parenthood is highly
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While free-exercise scholars endeavor to expose or fill the holes in Justice
Alito’s ostensibly originalist analysis,6 or to answer Justices Barrett and
Kavanaugh’s uncertainties, this Article offers a path to permanent avoidance
of the Smith question in the foster care context, as well as in other child welfare
contexts,7 a path down which Justice Robert’s majority opinion in Fulton took
a first step by holding that foster care in Philadelphia is not a public
accommodation. In fact, the Article shows this alternative path is the only
constitutionally appropriate one, because of the distinctive nature of the state
child welfare system relative to other public and private operations where
similar conflicts arise—in short, that it is a function the state carries out in a
parens patriae rather than police power capacity. The Article thus explains
why the path to victory for Catholic Social Services (“CSS”) in Philadelphia,
and for religious agencies in similar circumstances elsewhere, should be one
lit by rights of children, which the agencies should have standing to assert,
rather than any rights of their own. Courts should dismiss religious fostercare agencies’ First Amendment claims as simply inapposite, a category
error, because the state is not constrained by First Amendment rights of third
parties when acting in the fiduciary capacity that parens patriae authority
entails. It should also recognize, however, that children have Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights against the government’s seizing them and
then treating them as distributable goods whose fate is influenced by
solicitude for the sentiments and equality claims of aspiring foster parents.
Part I first situates Fulton within two broader contexts—the clash between
social equality rights for sexual minorities and religious freedom, and a
pattern of eliding children from legal contests over their lives. It then explains

6

7

selective rather than broadly open to the public. Id. at 1927–29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Alito,
Thomas, and Gorsuch note that the City can now simply amend its foster-agency contracts to
eliminate the allowance for exceptions, id. at 1887 (Alito, J., concurring), and that state courts get
the final word on interpretation of state and local law, id. at 1887 n.21 (Alito, J., concurring).
Curiously, on the core textual question of whether “exercise of religion” should be construed
narrowly to cover only worship and expression of belief, or instead so broadly as to include any
conduct motivated by religious belief, Justice Alito relied only on a 1943 decision of the Court to
support the latter answer. Id. at 1913 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Moreover, Justice Alito failed to acknowledge that the
historical record he cited in connection with a different question contained substantial support for
the former answer (e.g., state constitutions referring specifically to worship) and almost none for the
latter. Id. at 1898 n.33 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing N.Y. Const. art. XXXVIII (1777)) and S.C.
Const. art. VIII, § 1 (1790)); id. at 1907 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing N.Y. Const. art. XXXVIII
(1777)).
The Court can avoid deciding “the big question” in a Fulton II, should such a case materialize,
simply by holding that the City loses regardless of level of scrutiny. In another jurisdiction, however,
with different facts, the level of scrutiny could be determinative.
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why the standard constitutional framing of social equality versus religious
freedom contests is improper when the state is acting as guardian and proxy
for children or other non-autonomous persons. Part II sets out a proper
framework for analyzing these conflicts, elucidating the scope and nature of
the state’s parens patriae authority—a lacuna in constitutional jurisprudence.
Part III applies that framework to the foster care context, concluding that the
correct practical outcome in Philadelphia from a child-welfare perspective is
for the City to continue contracting with CSS, as the Supreme Court has
effectively ordered, while noting how different circumstances might yield a
different outcome in other localities.
I.

ADULT RIGHTS AND FOSTER CARE: SQUARE PEG, ROUND HOLE

The larger social context of the Fulton dispute is the intensifying battle
between advocates for sexual minorities and, on the other side, religious
individuals and organizations who demand freedom to carry on in public life
in accordance with beliefs opposed to recognition of same-sex unions or more
broadly to acceptance and equal treatment LGBTQ+ persons. From
government offices to bakeries to foster care agencies,8 the culture clash
predicted by the Obergefell dissenters has materialized and crescendoed in the
ensuing years and shows no signs of abating. The primary vehicles for it have
been public accommodation laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation and, conversely, religious exemptions from non-discrimination
laws. Some governments, such as the city government of Philadelphia, have
enacted and imposed on all private providers of certain services nondiscrimination mandates, and have thereby triggered First Amendment free
exercise challenges from religious organizations and individuals.9 Others

8

9

See Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020), denying cert. to Ermold v. Davis, 936 F.3d 429 (6th Cir.
2019) (denying certiorari to a case in which a county clerk had refused to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(holding that a Colorado commission’s cease-and-desist order against a baker resisting an
application of public accommodation law that would ostensibly require him to make cakes for samesex couples’ weddings violated the Free Exercise Clause); Buck v. Gordon, 959 F.3d 219 (6th Cir.
2020) (reviewing a case in which a Catholic foster care agency had refused service to a same-sex
couple).
See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719; New Hope Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Poole, 966 F.3d 145
(2d Cir. 2020) (holding that a Christian adoption agency had a plausible claim under the Free
Exercise Clause against a regulation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation);
Buck, 959 F.3d 219; Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Azar, 476 F.
Supp. 3d 570 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (dismissing a case brought by a Catholic archdiocese against federal
regulations governing child welfare funding that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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have attempted to accommodate religious beliefs and triggered Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection and First Amendment Establishment Clause
challenges from LGBTQ+ persons.10 Masterpiece Cakeshop, the bakery case,
was the first such conflict to reach the Supreme Court, and its narrow ruling
presaged a series of case-by-case resolutions.11
Courts and commentators have uniformly and unreflectively
presupposed the constitutional analysis should be the same across all contexts
in which these clashes occur.12 In any particular circumstance, within this
normative framework, state actors must justify infringing either rights of
same-sex married couples and LGBTQ+ individuals or rights of religious
organizations and individual adults. In any case, the primary justification
offered is the supposed rights on the other side.13 So every case comes to
courts as a contest between ascribed rights of two sets of adults—LGBTQ+

10

11
12

13

See, e.g., Marouf v. Azar, 391 F. Supp. 3d 23 (D.D.C. 2019) (partially granting a motion to dismiss
a challenge brought under the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause against federal
subsidizing of a Catholic agency that refused to consider same-sex couple as foster care parents for
refugee children); Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (D. Mich. 2018) (holding that a Michigan
state practice of permitting religious adoption agencies to continue to operate with state funding
despite their denying access to same-sex couples violated the Establishment Clause and Equal
Protection Clause); Fam. Equal. v. Azar, Docket No. 1:20-cv-02403 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed Mar. 19, 2020)
(challenging U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Notice of Nonenforcement of
Health and Human Services Grants Regulation, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,809 (Nov. 19, 2019) (announcing
HHS’s refusal to enforce certain regulations promulgated in Health and Human Services Grants
Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,395 (Dec. 12, 2016) (to be codified at 75 C.F.R. pt. 300) prohibiting
discrimination based on, inter alia, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity in programs funded
by HHS)). For examples of state statutes embodying religious accommodation, see, e.g., N.D. CODE
50-12-07.1 (“A state or local government entity may not deny a child-placing agency any grant,
contract, or participation in a government program because of the child-placing agency’s objection
to performing, assisting, counseling, recommending, facilitating, referring, or participating in a
placement that violates the child-placing agency’s written religious or moral convictions or
policies.”); 10A OKL. ST. ANN. § 1-8-112 (same); VA. CODE § 63.2-1709.3(C) (similar).
Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances
must await further elaboration in the courts . . . .”).
See, e.g., Lawrence Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The Missing Equal Protection Argument in Fulton,
BALKANIZATION (July 29, 2020, 9:09 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-missingequal-protection-argument.html [https://perma.cc/3RHG-TGMG] (contending that it follows
straightforwardly from the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision that Philadelphia had an Equal
Protection Clause obligation to exclude CSS); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions
and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J. F. 201, 222 (2018) (“[L]egislation
of this kind is deeply at odds with the understanding of religious accommodation that guides the
Court’s reasoning in Masterpiece Cakeshop . . . .”).
See, e.g., Buck, 959 F.3d at 223 (“St. Vincent maintains that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee it the right to refrain from certifying same-sex couples for adoption. The Dumonts’
position is the inverse; they claim that the State may not allow St. Vincent to turn away same-sex
couples without violating prospective foster or adoptive parents’ First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.”).
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persons seeking to marry, secure and retain employment, stay at a bed and
breakfast, become foster parents, for example, versus religious persons and
churches seeking to carry out their work in a manner consistent with their
religious beliefs.
The most pitched of these various battles, arguably, takes place in the
child welfare realm—in particular, concerning foster care and adoption.
Here what is at stake for same-sex couples and gay individuals is profound—
namely, whether they can fulfill the longing to occupy a parental role as to
one or more children. At the same time, faith-based agencies have
traditionally played an outsized role in child-welfare services, and some
denominations view this work as central to their mission, identity, and sacred
obligation.14
What is uniformly overlooked, including by all Justices in Fulton, is that
the children whose lives lie at center of the practices in dispute themselves
have constitutional rights at stake. Yet this should be obvious; foster care
entails government employees seizing persons from their homes and
choosing where and with whom they live. Such extraordinary state action
ought to be constrained, from start to finish, as to when it may occur and
how it is carried out, by constitutional rights of the persons seized. Foster
care is nothing like a bakery, children are not cakes, applicants for foster
parenthood are not consumers seeking access to a market, and private foster
care agencies are not businesses open to “the public.”15 Courts should be
applying a quite different legal framework to disputes such as that in Fulton,
one in which, the analysis to follow will show, neither free exercise rights nor
public accommodation law has any place.16
This is by no means the first time the legal world has treated children’s
lives as a battlefield for adults’ rights. To note just two other examples: In
the 1990s, the Boy Scouts of America was embroiled in litigation challenging
its exclusion of gay persons from scoutmaster positions, culminating in the
Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in which the
Court held that a First Amendment right of expressive association of the
14

15

16

Cf. Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706, 716 (D. Mich. 2018) (stating that “Catholic agencies
‘handl[e] approximately twenty percent of the active foster care and adoption cases in Michigan. .
. .’”).
Cf. Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (W.D. Mich. 2005), aff’d, 479 F.3d 403 (6th
Cir. 2007) (“Unlike unemployment benefits or the ability to hold office, a state contract for youth
residential services is not a public benefit.”).
Cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (“Children have a very special place in
life which law should reflect. Legal theories . . . lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred
to determination of a State’s duty towards children.”).
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organization (really, of its adult national leadership) trumped a state public
accommodation law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation.17 There was substantial debate in the lower courts in that and
similar cases about whether such private, membership-based organizations
could appropriately be characterized as public accommodations, but the
courts treated this as solely a question of statutory interpretation, as the Fulton
Court did regarding foster care.18 There was no consideration whether there
might be external constraints, including rights of the children who were the
actual members of the organization, on what states may treat as a public
accommodation and therefore as governed by rights of persons outside the
organization, or whether the BSA administration’s treatment of children’s
activities and experiences as an instrument of its expression was misplaced.
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided the fate of school voucher
programs, adjudicating in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris a contest between
taxpayers of Ohio, who claimed channeling public money to religious schools
violated the Establishment Clause because it had the primary effect of
advancing religion, and the State of Ohio, which defended the program
principally on the grounds that it was simply facilitating parents’ exercise of
their constitutional rights to choose where their children go to school.19 The
state did also assert that its ultimate aim was to help children in poor
communities stuck in failing schools, but its program required no
demonstration of academic adequacy by participating schools, and the
Supreme Court devoted no attention to either the factual question of whether
the program would actually result in better education for children or the legal
question whether children have any constitutional rights in connection with
state financing or regulation of their education—for example, against state
subsidizing of any forms of schooling that could be detrimental to them from
a secular perspective.20 The Supreme Court assimilated vouchers for
elementary school to state subsidies for adult education and treated parents
rather than children as the beneficiaries of the voucher program.21
17
18

19
20
21

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 308 N.J. Super. 516, 530–36, 706 A.2d 270, 277–81 (App. Div.
1998), aff’d, 734 A.2d 1196, 1208–1213 (N.J. 1999), rev’d and remanded, 530 U.S. 640, 656–659 (2000)
(reviewing the history of judicial renderings of “public accommodation” in various cases).
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–653 (2002).
Cf. JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON: A CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH TO
EDUCATION REFORM 207–10 (2002).
See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652–653 (“It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of
individuals defined without reference to religion, i.e., any parent of a school-age child who resides
in the Cleveland City School District. . . . Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest thus make clear that where a
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And now in litigation over foster care, the courts have largely overlooked
the children who are the raison d’etre for the program at issue, not asking
whether the children have any rights in connection with the foster-parent
selection process and giving only superficial consideration to children’s
interests. They make foster care yet another part of children’s lives viewed
principally as a site of contest between groups of adults and their supposed
rights, rather than framing the case as a contest between competing views of
which City policy is most consistent with the rights and welfare of the
children whom the City takes into its custody.
The central point of the Article is that a distinct set of constitutional
norms should apply to state action undertaken in a parens patriae capacity.
This point has much broader implications for constitutional law, insofar as it
applies in all contexts where the state makes decisions about the lives of nonautonomous persons of a sort ordinarily left to private choice—not just how
and where one receives shelter after escaping an injurious home
environment, but also with whom one forms and preserves family
relationships and whether and where one receives education, medical care,
and other personal services. Foster care might be the clearest case, though,
for casting the state’s role as the fiduciary one that parens patriae authority
embodies, a role entailing a duty of exclusive loyalty to the welfare of the
non-autonomous person and exclusion of concern for all others. That state
role is vital in any society,22 yet Anglo-American jurisprudence and
constitutional theory have largely ignored it.23 The next two Parts explain
its distinct nature and examine the norms that should govern its operation.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE STATE’S PARENS PATRIAE ROLE
In thinking about any constitutional challenges to state laws and actions,
lay persons generally assume the state is operating in a “police power” role.

22

23

government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a
broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of
their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge
under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits government aid to
reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual
recipients.”).
Cf. Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127, 168 (1844) (“Take this away and we become a nation of
savages. If there is no protection for the infant and the aged, the charm of civilization is lost.”);
Sohier v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 57 Mass. 483, 497 (1849) (deeming it “indispensable” that the
legislature be permitted to act in “[t]he best interest” of “infants . . . who cannot act for
themselves”).
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967), the Court said of parens patriae that “its meaning is murky,”
yet neither the Court nor legal scholars responded with clarifying analysis.
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In this familiar role, government serves the interests of citizens collectively,
in the course of which it must respect various individual rights, and it
manages conflicts among the rights and interests of various private parties.24
When it wears the police-power hat, the state must consider the interests of
everyone impacted by a legal rule or policy decision, typically giving equal
weight to like interests across all persons, and might recognize rights
protecting interests of some among those impacted. Applied to care and
raising of children, this would mean taking into account interests of anyone
who wishes to play a role, as well as the interests of children, and potentially
ascribing constitutional rights to persons other than children, on the basis of
which those persons can object to state decision making. In Fulton, the court
decisions and the briefing—even amicus briefs submitted by child-advocacy
organizations—uniformly place foster care within this police-power rubric,
resting their analyses on corporate interests of Philadelphia and on interests
and rights of private parties other than the children in foster care—in
particular, persons in same-sex marriages, taxpayers, and private agencies
like CSS.25 Indeed, the very nature of the ordinance applied to exclude CSS,
24

25

See
Police
Power,
BLACK’S
LAW
DICTIONARY,
https://blacks_law.enacademic.com/37693/police_power (last visited May 31, 2022) (“An authority conferred by the
American constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment, U.S. CONST., upon the individual states,
and, in turn, delegated to local governments, through which they are enabled to establish a special
department of police; adopt such laws and regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud
and crime, and secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by
preserving the public order, preventing a conflict of rights in the common intercourse of the citizens,
and insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges conferred upon him or her
by the general laws. . . . The police power is subject to limitations of the federal and State
constitutions, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police power is the exercise of the
sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and general
welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government.”).
See Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct 1868, 1875, 1882 (2021) (elaborating on CSS’s long-standing
mission and how the anti-discrimination mandate burdens its religious exercise), 1881 (noting that
the City asserted interests in “protecting the City from liability” and “ensuring equal treatment of
prospective foster parents” as well as more child-centered concerns); Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1924
(Alito, J., concurring) (“CSS’s policy has not hindered any same-sex couples from becoming foster
parents” and protecting against the emotional hurt some experience “is not an interest that can
justify the abridgment of First Amendment rights”), id. at 1925 (citing Obergefell’s promise to religious
objectors and opining that “society can keep that promise while still responding the ‘dignity,’
‘worth,’ and fundamental equality of all”); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. 661,
683 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (motivating concern of the City ordinance is that “[d]iscrimination in places of
public accommodation causes embarrassment and inconvenience to citizens and visitors of the City,
creates breaches of the peace, and is otherwise detrimental to the welfare and economic growth of
the City”), id. at 685 (“interest in ensuring that individuals who pay taxes to fund government
contractors are not denied access to those services”); Brief of Children’s Rts. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 18, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123)
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a prohibition on discrimination in “public accommodations,” suggests a
police power orientation.
Tellingly, the City had previously never treated the ordinance as
applicable to foster care,26 likely because it is in several ways manifestly
incompatible with the law and mission of the foster care system.27 The Fulton

26
27

(emphasizing City’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination, and noting that allowing any
agency to exclude same-sex couples would cause “great harm” to “families seeking to provide safe
and diverse placement opportunities”), id. at 19 (“Petitioners . . . must establish . . . that the balance
of equities tips in their favor and that an injunction is in the public interest.”), id. at 19 (“[B]est
interest of the public”), id. at 20 (proclaiming that a court decision in favor of CSS “tells all
Philadelphians that their government is unable to enforce its anti-discrimination policies or protect
them from discrimination . . . . The City’s taxpayers certainly have an interest in ensuring that the
millions of dollars in public funds CSS receives each year are not being used to allow that
government contractor to deny services to some of those very taxpayers.”), id. at 33 (invoking “the
‘constellation of benefits’ guaranteed to LGBTQ people”); Brief of Prospective Foster Parents
Subjected to Religiously Motivated Discrimination by Child-Placement Agencies as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 3, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123)
(“[R]eligiously motivated discrimination denies prospective foster parents like amici the opportunity
to partake of government services on the same terms as everyone else; and they receive the hurtful
message from a government program that their religious beliefs and their families are not of equal
dignity and worth”), id. at 26–27 (Philadelphia “must ensure that it does not violate constitutional
prohibitions” that generally apply to government in its police power role, such as the Establishment
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause); Brief of Massachussets et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 15, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123)
(expressing concern that religious exemptions “would implicate the States in the infliction of the
serious dignitary harms caused by discrimination”), id. at 18 (“Allowing government contractors to
discriminate not only threatens to diminish our pool of prospective foster parents but also involves
the government in causing grave social and dignitary harms.”).
See Fulton v. City of Phila., 922 F.3d 140, 158 (3d Cir. 2019).
Conflicts between the two sets of laws are glaring. The Fair Practices Ordinance (“FPO”) prohibits
discrimination based not only on sexual orientation but also disability, religion, and race. PHILA.,
FAIR PRAC. ORDINANCE § 9-1100. Yet Pennsylvania foster care law requires agencies that certify
foster parents to discriminate based on “ability to provide care” and “demonstrated stable mental
and emotional adjustment,” 55 PA. CODE § 3700.64, which would require disfavoring applicants
with mental or physical disabilities that interfere with caregiving or who adhere to a religion
opposed to medical care. That these bases for discriminating are relevant to child welfare does not
render their use non-discriminatory. In addition, Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) encourages religion-matching and race-matching, which amounts to discrimination
among persons once approved for fostering based on their religion (or lack thereof) and race. 11
PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 31 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); Brief for Petitioners at
13, Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123); Brief for Intervenor-Respondents
at 40, Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123). All these forms of discrimination,
endorsed by the City, could equally be said to “send[] the message that those discriminated against
are second-class citizens in the eyes of their own government,” Brief for Intervenor-Respondents,
supra, at 46, “denigrate[] the dignity of the excluded,” id. at 48, and be likely to deter many qualified
people from applying. Id. at 50. Further, it is unimaginable that the drafters of the FPO
contemplated its application to foster care, or to hiring of schoolteachers, daycare workers, public
health agency policymakers, or many other service providers. Public accommodation laws are
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majority recognized one aspect of the incompatibility, contrasting the
“customized and selective assessment”28 of potential foster parents with open
access to hotels, restaurants, and buses. But the lower court opinions and the
briefs to the Supreme Court were replete with characterizations of fosterparent certification as a service provided to “the public” generally, by which
they meant adult residents.29 Likewise, in connection with other disputes that
have arisen from application of a “public accommodation” law to foster care,
litigants, courts, and commentators have characterized foster-parent
recruitment as a service to the public, with respect to which adult residents
or taxpayers have a right of equal access.30
Why is the police-power constitutional framing of these disputes
mistaken? First, dispel the notion that there is a single constitutional law for
a unitary and constant entity called “the state.” Federal, state, and local
governments are multi-faceted, acting in a variety of capacities, and as
constitutional scholars well know, various sets of constitutional rules govern
state action in those different capacities, some departing more than others

28
29

30

fundamentally about access to physical spaces—museums, hotels, restaurants, schools, etc. See
PHILA., FAIR PRAC. ORDINANCE § 9-1106 (prohibiting denial of “any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities or privileges of such place of public accommodation”); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)
(defining “public accommodation” by presenting a long list of physical spaces).
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (2021).
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. 661, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“CSS provides
professional `services’ to the public. . . . CSS’s services are public accommodations . . . .”); Fulton,
922 F.3d at 165; Brief for Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 27, at 10 (“CSS’s performance of a
public service”), Brief in Opposition for Intervenor-Respondents at 31, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123) (quoting Brief of Massachusets et al., supra note
25) (characterizing the City’s contract with private agencies as a “mechanism for fulfilling its
obligations to serve the public”); Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 25, at 10 (“Philadelphia is
entitled to determine the parameters of the very services that it contracts out, reflecting its own
judgment regarding how best to meet its residents’ needs . . . .”), id. at 11 (“Governments may
impose conditions on their spending programs . . . .”), id. at 12 (characterizing states’ operating
foster care as “pursuing their proprietary interests” and noting “nondiscrimination requirements
. . . serve the plainly legitimate government interest of ensuring that government-contracted services
are offered to all residents”); Brief of Support Ctr. for Child Advoc. and Phila. Fam. Pride at 1, 2,
24, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123); Brief of Prospective Foster
Parents, supra note 25, at 3; Brief of Children’s Rts. et al. at 18, Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct.
1868 (2020) (No. 19-123); Brief of Baptist Joint Comm. for Religious Liberty et al. at 15–16, Fulton
v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123); Brief for President of House of Deputies of
Episcopal Church at al. at 22, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123).
See, e.g., Paula Rosenstein, Jocelyn Samuels, Alan Brownstein, & Maimon Schwarzschild, Symposium
Roundtable Lectures: Balancing LGBTQIA Rights and Religious Liberties-Commentary on the Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Lecture, 41 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 177, 187 (2019) (“I[, Alan Brownstein,] think there is no religion
liberty right for an institution to receive public funding to provide public services when the
institution indicates that it is going to deny to certain members of the public the benefits they are
eligible to receive under the law authorizing the funding of such services.”).
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from those governing police-power state action. Which particular set of rules
governs depends on which role government officials occupy when they act.
The text of the federal Constitution to some extent reflects this
multiplicity with respect to the federal government. A few provisions address
its dealings in the international realm,31 and clearly what our federal
government constitutionally may do toward other nations and against
individuals serving those nations is quite different from what it may do
domestically toward state and local governments and toward its own
citizens.32 Article I appoints Congress to act as a municipal legislature, for
the District of Columbia,33 in which capacity its acts are subordinate to its
legislation qua federal legislature. Apart from those few provisions, the
federal Constitution’s text does primarily reflect the predominant view of the
state’s core function—namely, domestic police power. But other roles
government serves, even domestically, are reflected in judicial doctrines that
have developed special constitutional authorizations or constraints on
governments in particular contexts—for example, when they act as
competitive business (e.g., postal service, public transit),34 employer,35

31

32

33
34

35

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (empowering the President, with consent of the Senate, to make treaties
with other nations); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (empowering Congress to declare war against other
nations, regulate commerce with them, and punish crimes committed in international waters).
See generally Alina Veneziano, Applying the U.S. Constitution Abroad, From the Era of the U.S. Founding to the
Modern Age, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 602 (2019) (discussing extraterritorial application of the federal
Constitution).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Cf. Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, The Sovereign in Commerce, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1101,
1108 (2021) (arguing that government should not enjoy the Constitution’s protections for the
sovereign when it is engaged in commercial activity); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 303–04 (1974) (holding that a public bus is not a public forum for free speech purposes because
it is a commercial enterprise).
See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (rejecting “theory of one”
employment discrimination claim, stating that “there is a crucial difference, with respect to
constitutional analysis, between the government exercising ‘the power to regulate or license, as
lawmaker,’ and the government acting ‘as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.’”) (citation
omitted); Garcetti v. Ceballos 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”).
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jailor,36 speaker in the public square,37 service provider,38 funder of private
service provision,39 party to contract,40 educator,41 and, of particular
relevance here, parens patriae guardian of non-autonomous persons.42
36

37

38
39

40

41

42

See Johanna Kalb, Gideon Incarcerated: Access to Counsel in Pretrial Detention, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
101, 111 (2018) (explaining how the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987), “fundamentally reshaped the way that courts view the constitutional law of prisons”).
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“[V]iewpoint-based funding
decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker.”); Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (explaining government speech doctrine). The
district court in Fulton characterized the City’s contractual demands on agencies as a form of
government speech, to which normal First Amendment doctrine does not apply. Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. 661, 697 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
See Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assoc., 460 U.S. 37. 48–49 (1983) (prescribing
different free speech analysis for nonpublic fora such as internal operations of school district).
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–95, 203 (1991) (upholding conditions on government
grants under Title X of the Public Health Service Act preventing grant programs from providing
to their patients not only abortion services but also counseling or information about abortion, even
though government could not otherwise prohibit such speech).
The district court in Fulton itself suggested different constitutional rules apply when a government
unit is contracting with private parties, to retain them to carry out government functions, than when
it is doling out public benefits, noting “a distinction between cases involving essential government
benefits such as unemployment compensation or the ability to hold office, and ‘a state contract for
. . . services.’” Fulton, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (quoting Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d, 827,
838 (W.D. Mich. 2005)).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“[T]he First Amendment rights
of students in the public schools . . . must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment.’ A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic
educational mission,’ even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the
school.”) (citations omitted).
See Parens Patriae, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, nolo.com/dictionary/parenspatriae-term.html [https://perma.cc/Q5SH-MSUU] (last visited May 31, 2022) (“Latin for
‘parent of his or her country.’ The power of the state to act as guardian for those who are unable
to care for themselves, such as children or disabled individuals.”); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 315 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Missouri has a parens patriae interest in
providing Nancy Cruzan, now incompetent, with as accurate as possible a determination of how
she would exercise her rights under these circumstances.”); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373
(1986) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979)) (“The state has a legitimate interest
under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“Acting to
guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many
other ways.”) (footnotes omitted); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (“This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State . . . . [I]t is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised
. . . for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.”). Beginning in the late
nineteenth century, the term “parens patriae” came also to be used for the very different
circumstance in which a state brings suit in federal court on behalf of the people of the state,
typically suing corporations for antitrust or environmental violations or other states for depletion of
resources. See Wright & Miller, State As Party—Introduction—Parens Patriae And Private Disputes, 17 FED.
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Second, recognize that when the state exerts control over the lives of nonautonomous persons because of their incapacity, to make for them kinds of
decisions autonomous persons are entitled to and ordinarily do make for
themselves, such as where they will receive temporary shelter after escaping
an abusive home environment, the state necessarily acts in a parens patriae
capacity.43 Having determined that as a general matter those types of
decisions do not properly fall within the police power, to be dictated by
collective societal interests, the only warrant for the state’s intrusion into
private life in that way in the particular case of a child or other nonautonomous person is the needs of the non-autonomous individual. It is
important to clarify, then, the nature of that role. Many judges and legal
scholars refer to parens patriae in various child welfare contexts while
appearing not to understand what it means. They say something of the “let
us not forget about the children” sort and suggest adding children’s interests
into the mix along with competing adult interests or societal interests.44 That
is not doing parens patriae; that is, as an afterthought, trying not to do police
power very badly, by leaving out of a broad utilitarian calculus a group of
persons with the most important interests at stake. If simply not forgetting to
add children to the policy mix were parens patriae, the concept would be
entirely superfluous.45 It would also be misleading, insofar as it would suggest
that if the state does not choose to put on the parens patriae mantle in a given
situation then it need not consider the interests of non-autonomous persons
at all.
To the contrary, when the state truly carries out its parens patriae
function, it is not acting as agent for society collectively, weighing and
balancing everyone’s interests. Rather, it acts as agent solely for the
dependent individual, with an exclusive focus on that individual’s wellbeing,

43

44
45

PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4047 (3d ed.); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez,
458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
See James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination and Children’s Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State
Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 79, 120–121 (2012) (explaining that the state acts
in a parens patriae capacity when it exerts authority over individuals who are incapacitated to make
their own decisions, such as when the state makes child custody decisions).
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] parent’s interests
in a child must be balanced against the State’s long-recognized interests as parens patriae. . . .”).
Cf. Sallyanne Payton, The Concept of the Person in the Parens Patriae Jurisdiction Over Previously Competent
Persons, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 605, 641 (1992) (“The parens patriae jurisdiction . . . is fundamentally
unlike other powers of the state.”).
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as a guardian does for a ward and a lawyer does for a client.46 As with those
private fiduciaries, the duty of loyalty proscribes both self-dealing and
simultaneously serving another party with potentially conflicting interests.47
From its origins in medieval England, this is how the state’s parens patriae
role and responsibility were understood. One commentator writes regarding
formerly-competent adults:
Under the law that has governed the parens patriae jurisdiction ever since it
was created in the middle ages in England, a person whose powers of selfmanagement have been taken from him by the state has a right that those
who exercise the power to manage his affairs on his behalf do so in a fiduciary
capacity. . . .The state takes jurisdiction only as a trustee: the jurisdiction has
been designed to avoid vesting in the state any authority or incentive to act
in a self-interested manner vis-à-vis the incompetent. . . . 48
46

47

48

Cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (“Children, the insane, and those who
are irreversibly ill with loss of brain function, for instance, all retain ‘rights,’ to be sure, but often
such rights are only meaningful as they are exercised by agents acting with the best interests of their
principals in mind.”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(“the States are vested with the historic parens patriae power, including the duty to protect ‘persons
under legal disabilities to act for themselves.’ . . . [H]owever the power is implemented, due
process requires that it not be invoked indiscriminately. At a minimum, a particular scheme for
protection of the mentally ill must rest upon a legislative determination that it is compatible with
the best interests of the affected class . . . .”); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 661 (1st Cir. 1980)
(“Following a determination of incompetency, state actions based on parens patriae interests must
be taken with the aim of making treatment decisions as the individual himself would were he
competent to do so.”); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
431 (Mass. 1977) (adopting “substituted judgment” standard).
Certain private fiduciary roles, such as trustee, do entail serving multiple individuals with competing
interests—with a trust, life estate holders and remainder persons. Their duty of loyalty entails an
obligation of fairness between classes of beneficiaries as well as proscriptions against self-dealing or
using trust property to serve interests of non-beneficiaries. A trustee is, however, a special kind of
fiduciary chosen by a property owner to administer wealth gratuitously transferred, at least in part,
to other persons. The non-grantor beneficiaries do not have the same moral or legal claims vis the
trustee—in particular, that they not simultaneously serve any other person with conflicting
interests–that incompetent wards have vis guardians appointed to assume control over central
aspects of their life. Criddle and Fox-Decent posit that some private fiduciaries, including attorneys
and doctors, are simultaneously fiduciaries to both individual clients/patients and society as a
whole—e.g., with duties to promote values of legal and healthcare systems. See Evan J. Criddle,
Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew S. Gold, Sung Hui Kim, & Paul B. Miller, FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT
70–71, 79 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 1st ed. 2018) (explaining fiduciary duties of attorneys and
doctors to both their clients and the public). However, their characterization of the professionals’
duties to society as making the professionals fiduciaries to the state is questionable (the duties could
be viewed simply as side constraints), the propriety of ascribing those duties is contested, and the
authors offer no normative defense for compromising individuals’ interests by ascribing such duties
to systems.
Payton, supra note 45, at 617. See also id. at 616 (“[D]esigned from the beginning to be wholly
fiduciary duties. . . . the state’s role has been exclusively that of trustee.”); Michael J. Higdon,
Parens Patriae and the Disinherited Child, 95 Wash L. Rev. 619, 642-43 (2020) (characterizing parens
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Nineteenth-century American legal scholar John Norton Pomeroy wrote
similarly regarding state protection of “infants”: “the exercise of the
jurisdiction depends upon the sound and enlightened discretion of the court,
and has for its sole object the highest well-being of the infant. . . .”49
Thus, a quite different set of rules applies to the state’s actions and
decisions in the parens patriae role.50 When the state chooses to assume
control over aspects of a non-autonomous person’s life that are ordinarily
matters of constitutionally-protected self-determination for autonomous
persons—that is, that the state may not constrain in order to gratify other
persons or serve social causes, such as with whom the non-autonomous
person will live and what services they will receive, and its purported
justification is the need of that person for protection and assistance, rather
than harm that person might cause others, it effectively steps out of its role
as agent of “the people” and into that person’s shoes. All it is authorized to
do is to protect and assist that person, to act as a proxy to guard and promote
the dependent person’s interests, to the same extent that person would be
entitled to do if capable—that is, without limitation arising from others’
interests. There is no conceivable moral or constitutional justification for the

49
50

patriae as “both the right and the duty of the state ‘to make decisions that are in the best interests of
vulnerable persons.’”); Daniel L. Hatcher, Purpose vs. Power: Parens Patriae and Agency Self-Interest, 42
N.M. L. Rev. 159, 171–72 (2012) (“The purpose of state human service agencies to serve vulnerable
populations such as abused and neglected children derives from the common law doctrine of
parents patriae . . . . State child welfare agencies exist to protect the interests, and the rights, of
abused and neglected children. . . . The agencies serve in the nature of a fiduciary for children’s
rights, and the agencies’ interests and actions are intended to align with the best interests of the
children.”); id. at 164 (“[I]n American jurisprudence . . . the parens patriae doctrine was quickly
established as providing the foundational authority and duty of states to serve and protect the best
interests of children.”); Developments in the Law–The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1199 (1980) (“[W]hen the state acts as parens patriae, it should advance only the best interests of the
incompetent individual and not attempt to further other objectives, deriving from its police power,
that may conflict with the individual’s welfare.”); id. at 1200 (‘it should exercise the parens patriae
power solely to further the best interests of the child’); Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine
of Parens Patriae, 27 Emory L.J. 195, 196 (1978) (“In regard to lunatics, the crown served as a ‘mere
trustee’. . . .”); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 315–16 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Missouri has a parens patriae interest in providing Nancy Cruzan, now incompetent,
with as accurate as possible a determination of how she would exercise her rights under these
circumstances.”); J v. C [1969] AC 668, 697 (Guest LJ) (“[T]he law administered by the Chancery
Court as representing the Queen as parens patriae never required that the father’s wishes should
prevail over the welfare of the infant. The dominant consideration has always been the welfare of
the infant.”); Smith v. Smith, 26 Eng. Rep 977, 977 (Ch. 1745) (“It is not a profitable jurisdiction
of the crown, but for the benefit of infants themselves, who must have some common parent.”).
3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1307, 330 n.1 (1883).
Developments in the Law, supra note 48, at 1200 (“Given the different premises and purposes of the
police power and the parens patriae power, courts should apply different principles when they analyze
laws based on these two powers.”).
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state’s assuming such control over the personal life of a private individual in
such circumstances (i.e., where the person poses no threat of harm to others)
in a liberal society except to protect and serve that person, to do for the person
what, as best the state can tell, they would want if capable of rationally
deciding for themselves.51 No sound moral or constitutional argument could
support a view that a person’s lack of autonomy justifies the state or anyone
else exploiting them, in the sense of taking advantage of their incapacity to
use them to serve interests of other individuals or of society collectively in
circumstances where the state would not be permitted to so use an
autonomous person. (Indeed, if and when it is appropriate for a state to use
private individuals for any particular collective ends, it arguably should use
autonomous persons first, as they are better able to protect themselves against
inequity and over-reaching.)
Moreover, the state’s power over private lives cannot extend beyond its
legitimate justification.52 The state must not, simply because it has one
proper and sufficient basis for seizing children from their homes and
assuming power to decide where they will subsequently live, in connection
with which it enlists private agencies to assist, view itself as thereby licensed
to extend its power over the children’s lives farther, to serve other purposes
that are not themselves proper bases for such action—in particular, to serve
interests of some group of adults or some progressive societal aims. Clearly,
the state could not take possession of infants solely for the purpose of securing
children for same-sex couples to raise, as part of a larger agenda of creating
conditions of social equality for sexual minorities. Having some other
legitimate purpose for taking possession of infants (i.e., removing them from

51

52

Cf. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51–52 (Mass. 1981) (“Absent an overwhelming State
interest, a competent individual has the right to refuse such treatment. To deny this right to persons
who are incapable of exercising it personally is to degrade those whose disabilities make them wholly
reliant on other, more fortunate, individuals. In order to accord proper respect to this basic right
of all individuals, we feel that if an incompetent individual refuses antipsychotic drugs, those
charged with his protection must seek a judicial determination of substituted judgment.”).
Cf. Payton, supra note 45, at 617 (“Were it not for the fiduciary nature of this custody, which gives
the ward rights against his custodians, the incompetent’s disappearance as an empowered legal
person would work a forfeiture exceeding any punishment imposed under the criminal law . . . .
The fiduciary nature of the parens patriae jurisdiction over formerly competent incompetents
therefore is critical to the legitimacy of the state’s exercise of power over them, since the state . . .
would otherwise in effect confiscate the body and property of an incompetent human being . . . on
the sole ground of his incompetence.”); id. at 641 (“The state acquired its power as part of a
medieval bargain made in the ethical structure of feudalism, under which the King became the
servant, not the master, of persons whom he brought under his protection. The powers of the state
over the incompetent are tolerable only if fiduciary in nature and if administered in good faith out
of fiduciary motive.”).
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an injurious environment or caretaker) does not transform the social equality
aim into a legitimate objective the state may now strive also to serve with any
children in its possession. The interests of third parties and progressive
societal aims of that sort should never be any part of the state’s reasoning
about whether it should assume custody of children and how it should deal
with any children it does take into its custody. This principle applies across
all child welfare contexts in which the state’s sole legitimate basis for
involving itself is children’s inability to act or make important decisions on
their own behalf to serve their own wellbeing.53 The parens patriae role of
the state, conceived of as distinct agent solely for non-autonomous persons,
is an exclusive fiduciary role, to which the norms of state police power are
simply inapplicable.
At least two constitutional provisions embody rights of children against
instrumental treatment in such situations.54 The Fourth Amendment
establishes a right of all persons against the state’s seizing them from their

53

54

For applications of this principle in other contexts, see James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The
State, Parentage, and The Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 822 (2009) (“[T]he state’s
proxy decision-making should not entail sacrificing the interests of the nonautonomous person in
order to serve the interests or desires of other parties.”); James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination
and Children’s Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ.
L. REV. 79 (2012) (discussing the viewpoint that states should only consider the interests of the child
when making custody decisions); James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994) (discussing this principle in the context of
school regulation). The clearest contrasting case is seizure and delinquency adjudication as to
minors who commit crimes. In that context, the state has a police power justification for its actions,
to protect the rest of society, as well as concern for the minors’ wellbeing, and it therefore
appropriately acts in a police power role. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (“When
making any detention decision, the Family Court judge is specifically directed to consider the needs
and best interests of the juvenile as well as the need for the protection of the community.”). It is a
common mistake to speak of the state acting in a parens patriae role in the delinquency context.
See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1966) (“The Juvenile Court is theoretically
engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society . . . . The objectives are to provide
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society . . . . The State is
parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.”). If the community’s interests influence
decisions, as is appropriate, then the state is operating in a police power role, which is conceptually
incompatible with acting in a parens patriae role; it is impossible for the state to wear both hats
simultaneously.
It is now well-established in federal court jurisprudence that state obligations to foster children are
of constitutional dimension. See, e.g., Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“[F]oster children have ‘a federal constitutional right to state protection’ while they remain in the
care of the State.”) (quoting Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 846-47 (9th
Cir. 2010)).
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home.55 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies
a right of all persons against state intrusion into and exertion of control over
their private lives.56 We autonomous adults certainly have strong
constitutional rights against state custody and state interdictions that presume
to dictate with whom we shall live or associate, what education or other
training we shall receive, and what healthcare we shall receive.57 That some
persons are less than fully autonomous does not erase these rights for them,
but rather merely gives the state paternalistic warrant for infringing the rights
to the limited extent of stepping in as a proxy to take action and make
decisions in their behalf. This is often overlooked in connection with

55

56

57

See Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2018) (“‘[w]e evaluate the claims of children who
are taken into state custody under the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures. . . .’”) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 792 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2015));
Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Parents and children have
a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference. . . .
Officials violate this right if they remove a child from the home absent ‘information at the time of
the seizure that establishes “reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of
serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific
injury.”’ The Fourth Amendment also protects children from removal from their homes absent
such a showing.”) (quoting Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000)).
See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment right
against civil commitment to a psychiatric facility); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993) (finding
it consistent with the state’s parens patriae obligation to mentally disabled persons subject to civil
commitment to allow family members to participate as parties in the proceedings because this
increases accuracy of decisions “without undermining those interests of the individual protected by
the Due Process Clause”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 (1993) (O’Connor & Souter, JJ.,
concurring) (“a child’s constitutional ‘[f]reedom from bodily restraint’ is no narrower than an
adult’s”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (discussing a child’s procedural due process rights in
connection with commitment by parent to mental hospital). See also Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 223 (1990) (discussing a mentally ill prisoner’s right to refuse psychotropic drugs);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (noting the substantive due process right of
mentally-disabled persons involuntarily committed to a state institution to safe conditions, freedom
from unreasonable bodily restraint, and minimally adequate training); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]hen the state places a child in state-regulated foster care,
the state has entered into a special relationship with that child which imposes upon it certain
affirmative duties.”); Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(children in foster care “have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and
unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being.”), aff’d,126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997); Brown
v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 661 (1985) (children have right to maintain relationship
with foster parents, as against public agency’s plan to change placement for its own convenience);
§ 1:14 RIGHTS OF COMMITTED OR PLACED PERSONS, INCAPACITY, POWERS OF ATTORNEY &
ADOPTION IN CONN. § 1:14 (4th ed.) (discussing committed persons’ rights).
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“[A] competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment”). The right
against health-related treatment may be infringed for the sake of preventing harm to others, as with
vaccinations. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
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children’s lives,58 and it is rarely tested in connection with non-autonomous
adults,59 but it is reflected rather explicitly in, for example, laws prohibiting
potentially harmful medical experimentation on autonomy-compromised
patients,60 and it is implicit in various state laws instantiating a best-interests
standard for state decisions about non-autonomous persons’ lives.61
The state’s acting under parens patriae authority is clearest when it
chooses not merely to offer assistance or services to non-autonomous persons,
or to impose constraints on private parties dealing with non-autonomous
persons, but physically to take possession of and hold such a person in its
custody ostensibly just for that person’s own good. In that circumstance, the
state is clearly empowered and restricted by the norms appropriate to that
authority, and not by those inherent in the police-power role. Childprotection custody and foster-care placement are thus, like state custody of

58

59

60

61

See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Erasing the Last Vestiges of Human Property, 93
B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 53, 54 (2013) (discussing the Indian Child Welfare Act, which explicitly treats
children as a tribal “resource”); Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1454–55 (2006) (“The [National Association of Black Social Workers]
described whites’ adoption of African American children as ‘a form of race and cultural genocide’
because African American children raised in white homes would associate and identify with the
dominant white culture and thereby be removed from the African American community, physically
and psychologically.”); James G. Dwyer, Changing the Conversation About Children’s Education, 43
NOMOS 314 (2002) (critiquing philosophical arguments and Supreme Court decisions predicating
parental power over children’s education which disregard children’s developmental needs,
including “democratic education” arguments for a collective right of adult citizens to shape the next
generation).
But see, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990) (holding that the only
constitutional right in connection with a life-support decision for an adult in a persistent vegetative
state belongs to the patient herself, and that the state was not at all constrained by her parents’
wishes).
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (including among requirements for Institutional Review Board approval
of federally funded research involving human subjects: “When some or all of the subjects are likely
to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such as children, prisoners, individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons,
additional safeguards have been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these
subjects.”).
See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70(a) (“In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody
of the child in either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is for the best interest of the
child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award accordingly.”); VA.
CODE §§ 64.2-2000 (defining “guardian” as a person “who is responsible for the personal affairs of
an incapacitated person, including responsibility for making decisions regarding the person’s
support, care, health, safety, habilitation, education, therapeutic treatment, and if not inconsistent
with an order of involuntary admission, residence”), 64.2-2019-20 (specifying guardians’ duties and
powers). See also Brief for Historians of Child Welfare as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
4, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123) (“[T]he doctrine of parens
patriae . . . provided the foundation for the state’s active role in child welfare and the postrevolutionary creation of the ‘best interests of the child’ standard”).
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or decision making for incapacitated adults who pose no threat to others,62
quintessential parens patriae state actions and have always been viewed as
such.
In contrast, in other Supreme Court cases involving same-sex couples or
LGBTQ+ persons, including those in which businesses or individuals have
sought exemption from anti-discrimination laws,63 the state action at issue
was properly taken pursuant to the police power role. No non-autonomous
persons were involved, and the state was appropriately balancing competing
interests of different groups of private individuals.
III. REFRAMING FOSTER CARE CONTROVERSIES
In the foster care and other child welfare contexts, courts and legal
theorists have paid too little attention to the norms inherent in parens patriae
authority, but some basic and incontrovertible principles take us a long way.
First, as explained above, the parens patriae role is that of a fiduciary for a
particular individual, like a guardian.64 A fiduciary is an agent or proxy,
standing in the shoes of its principal, acting for the benefit of the principal or
ward.65 Second, a fiduciary role is inherently an exclusive role; the state
62

63

64

65

Cf. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573–75 (1975) (stating that the only constitutionally
permissible bases for maintaining custody of a mentally ill person are “to prevent injury to the
public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness,” and not to serve any
interests of members of the public, such as sparing them from having to look at such persons); In re
Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (“[I]n making the decision of whether to
authorize sterilization, a court should consider only the best interest of the incompetent person, not
the interests or convenience of the individual’s parents, the guardian or of society”); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 661–62 (N.J. 1976) (rejecting claim by parents of an adult in a persistent vegetative
state that they had a right based on their religious beliefs to decide that life support would be
terminated, stating “we do not recognize an independent parental right of religious freedom to
support the relief requested”).
See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) (“Our
society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and
in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of their
freedom on terms equal to others must be given weight and respect by the courts.”).
See
Parens
Patriae,
NOLO’S
PLAIN-ENGLISH
LAW
DICTIONARY,
https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/parens-patriae-term.html [https://perma.cc/GD8W-4QV3]
(last visited May 31, 2022) (defining parens patriae as “[t]he power of the state to act as guardian
for those who are unable to care for themselves”).
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982) (“[A] State may, for a variety
of reasons, attempt to pursue the interests of a private party, and pursue those interests only for the
sake of the real party in interest. Interests of private parties are obviously not in themselves
sovereign interests, and they do not become such simply by virtue of the State’s aiding in their
achievement. In such situations, the State is no more than a nominal party.”); Fiduciary, BLACK’S
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cannot coherently occupy it and a competing role at the same time. For
inherent in being a fiduciary is adherence to a duty of undivided loyalty.66 It
is thus a mistake ever to speak of the state carrying out both a parens patriae
role and a police power role at the same time in any given situation. If it is
proper for the state to consider interests of other persons, as it is in the
juvenile delinquency context, then it cannot act in a parens patriae capacity,
and to speak of it as doing so is misleading. The state can and should act to
further juveniles’ interests in the course of delinquency disposition, while also
protecting the rest of society, but that does not transform the state’s role into
parens patriae, any more than it would if the state acted to promote adult
criminals’ wellbeing through sentencing. Conversely, when the state is truly
wearing the parens patriae hat, then it may not consider the interests of
persons other than the one(s) for whom it is acting as fiduciary.
This is not to say a fiduciary may do whatever it wishes to serve the
principal, exceeding the bounds of permissible action to which the principal
would themselves be subject if acting autonomously. Rather, it means the

66

LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/fiduciary/ [https://perma.cc/9T85-WAP5]
(“[A] person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in
respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which
it requires. Thus, a person is a fiduciary who is invested with rights and powers to be exercised for
the benefit of another person.”).
See, e.g., UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 802 (declaring that a trustee shall administer a trust solely in the
beneficiaries’ interests). In cases of civil commitment of persons who pose a danger to themselves
or others, the state might seem to be trying to combine the parens patriae and police power roles).
See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“The state has a legitimate interest under
its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”). As noted, supra, this is
conceptually impossible. States generally attempt to deal with the inherent conflict by appointing
an independent advocate for the person committed and providing a mechanism for the advocate
to assert the person’s rights against the institution. See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental
Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 318, 321–22 (Mass. 1983) (concluding that persons involuntarily
committed have a right to a substituted judgment treatment decision by a court before
nonconsensual administration of medication, and to a finding of an emergency necessity for forcible
medication over a patient’s objection as a chemical restraint). States generally appoint an
independent advocate for children in maltreatment actions as well, usually a lawyer styled as a
“guardian ad litem” or GAL, but the GAL’s involvement is limited to court proceedings and foster
care review and permanency meetings; they do not include participation in or challenge to the
public agency’s decisions about which private foster care agencies they use. See, e.g., COURT
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, ADVOCACY IN MOTION: A GUIDE
TO IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS TO GOVERN THE PERFORMANCE OF GUARDIANS AD
LITEM FOR CHILDREN (2018), 8–9 (“When appointed for a child, the guardian ad litem shall
vigorously represent the child [in connection with all proceedings involved in the matter], fully
protecting the child’s interest and welfare. The guardian ad litem shall advise the court of the
wishes of the child in any case where the wishes of the child conflict with the opinion of the guardian
ad litem as to what is in the child’s interest and welfare.”).
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fiduciary may not aim to serve its own interests or those of third parties
through its decisions concerning the personal life of the principal/ward, and
it is not constrained by interests of others to any greater extent than the
principal would be if acting autonomously.67 It is also not to say that a
fiduciary must do everything possible, expending all its resources for the sake
of the ward, but doing as much as one can for a ward with finite resources is
quite different from using one’s position fortuitously to serve other causes.68
The judiciary has at times recognized these propositions in connection
with foster care and adoption. For example, in Lofton v. Secretary of the
Department of Children & Family Services, although the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals ultimately reached the wrong outcome due to errors in factual
judgment, it got the normative framework correct when it stated:
[I]n formulating its adoption policies and procedures, the State of Florida
acts in the protective and provisional role of in loco parentis for those children
who, because of various circumstances, have become wards of the state.
Thus, adoption law is unlike criminal law . . . [and] is also distinct from such
contexts as government-benefit eligibility schemes or access to a public
forum . . . . By contrast, in the adoption context, the state’s overriding
interest is the best interests of the children whom it is seeking to place with
adoptive families. . . . Florida, acting parens patriae for children who have lost
their natural parents, bears the high duty of determining what adoptive
home environments will best serve all aspects of the child’s growth and
development. Because of the primacy of the welfare of the child, the state
can make classifications for adoption purposes that would be constitutionally
suspect in many other arenas.69

67

68

69

Cf. Brief for Historians of Child Welfare, supra note 61, at 8 (“After the American Revolution . . .
courts recognized that the government was ‘a guardian of all children, and may interfere at any
time and in any way to protect and advance their welfare and interests.’”); JEFFREY SHULMAN,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITYIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF
THE CHILD (2014), 56 (“As parens patriae, the state has plenary power to legislate on behalf of the
child.”).
Cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (stating in the immigration context with respect to
unaccompanied minors in federal custody that “to give one or another of the child’s additional
interests priority over other concerns that compete for public funds and administrative attention—
is a policy judgment rather than a constitutional imperative”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
766 (1982) (“Two state interests are at stake in parental rights termination proceedings—a parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative
interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings.”); Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded
Child., Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a state institution for mentally
disabled persons violated residents’ rights to shelter, clothing, and training of a certain quality, and
to safe conditions and freedom from undue bodily restraints, but that residents did not have
constitutionally protected liberty interest in visiting shops, restaurants, and recreational facilities in
the outside community nor to community placements).
358 F.3d 804, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2004). In categorically banning adoptions by gays and lesbians,
Florida was quite misguided in carrying out the parens patriae role.
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In Lipscomb v. Simmons, which concerned foster care, four judges of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “[W]hen the state exercises power
over children as parens patriae, it ‘exercises a discretion in the interest of the
child.’”70 In this role, the judges wrote, the state “takes on a grave
responsibility to that child” and its decisions must be “guided by an
overarching objective: maximizing the child’s welfare.” “Each child,” they
explained, “is entitled to have key decisions as to its care made in light of his
own best interests, rather than to serve some collateral purpose.”71 This type
of “individualized standard is uniformly accepted by states as the touchstone
for exercises of their parens patriae power . . . . [T]he state’s parens patriae power
over children is limited to actions ‘which conduce to an infant’s welfare . . .
.’”72
Thus, when Philadelphia or any other local government takes protective
custody of abused and neglected children, it necessarily acts only in a parens
patriae capacity, as protector of and agent for those children, and cannot
(also) act in a police power capacity. It owes a duty of undivided loyalty to
the children, it must to the extent reasonably possible act solely to protect the
interests and advance the welfare of the children, and it is limited in doing so
by interests of other parties only to the extent that an autonomous private
individual would be in a comparable situation.
Therefore, many rights adults might have against government under the
U.S. Constitution in other contexts, constraining the government’s actions,
simply do not apply in the context of securing foster homes for individual
children. With respect to other government acts, such as issuing marriage
licenses or employing people, a state or local government might be
prohibited from discriminating against some persons based on their religion
or sexual orientation, but in providing for maltreated children in its custody
the government is not so constrained, at least not by rights of those persons.
No group of adults, religious or otherwise, has a basic or equality right to be
part of the foster-care process for an individual child. Each child, on the
other hand has a negative right against the state’s taking custody and
dictating his or her residence and relationships for any purpose other than to

70
71
72

962 F.2d 1374, 1386 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1388–89.
Id. at 1388 n.8 (citations omitted). Cf. C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me. 2004) (“When
exercising its parens patriae power, the court puts itself in the position of a ‘wise, affectionate, and
careful parent’ and makes determinations for the child’s welfare, focusing on ‘what is best for the
interest of the child’ and not on the needs or desires of the parents.”).
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protect and promote the child’s interests. That is, therefore, the sole
constitutional constraint relevant to Fulton and the other foster care cases.
By way of analogy, consider:
An adult victim of domestic violence calls the police. When the officers
arrive, she asks them to take her to the police station. At the station, they
inform her there is a network of private safe houses in the city, overseen by
thirty private agencies that recruit and train shelter providers. One agency,
they tell her, is Catholic and because of church doctrine has a policy of not
working with same-sex married couples who wish to become providers.
Except for that limitation on the pool from which it draws, the Catholic
agency is regarded as the best; it does an outstanding job finding
extraordinarily caring and dedicated people and preparing them to help
domestic violence victims. The woman decides to appeal to the Catholic
agency for help, so the police officers drive her to the agency’s office.

In this scenario, the abuse victim has done nothing illegal or immoral. In
acting and making choices for herself, she owes no legal or moral duty to
anyone else. She is absolutely entitled to use an agency that has a
discriminatory policy if she believes that will best serve her interests.
Whether she approves of or shares the agency’s religious beliefs is irrelevant.
No one would or justifiably could fault her for her choice. Nor are the police
officers to be faulted for making her aware of all the options, including one
whose policies are inconsistent with a non-discrimination norm the state
applies in other contexts, and transporting her to that agency.
When a state agency goes beyond merely informing abuse victims of
available options, to actually making the selection itself, for the reason that
the abuse victims are unable to make the selection for themselves, as with
incompetent adults victimized by guardians, the agency’s normative position
vis third parties is the same. The agency is under no obligation to anyone
but the non-autonomous person for whom it acts, so it does no wrong in
choosing that same Catholic agency in the hypothetical above to find shelter
for incompetent adult victims. Nor does the normative situation change if
the local government, recognizing that adult abuse victims, whether
autonomous or incompetent, who escape an abusive home environment
frequently have no resources to pay for services, elects to subsidize shelter
providers and the agencies that recruit and train them.73 That the state
expends public funds to carry out its parens patriae function does not give
rise to any rights on the part of third parties; it does not entitle them suddenly
to demand that the state constrain its caretaking for these dependent,

73

Cf. Samuels, Brownstein, and Schwarzschild, 41 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 177. 187 (noting that, in
Brownstein’s view, the fact of public funding “is a huge issue”).

880

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:4

victimized persons in order to avoid offending or disappointing the third
parties. If it did, the state could never actually operate in the parens patriae
role, unless perhaps when it could extract from the helpless persons it protects
full payment of its costs. In carrying out any of its multiple functions, the
state expends public funds, and that patently does not transform them all into
the same domestic police power function, constrained by the same individual
rights.
Consider another analogy. Many parents, in a will or “standby
guardianship” form, name someone to serve as legal guardian for their
children if the parents die while the children are still minors. Some parents
might discriminate in making the selection on bases such as sexual
orientation, religion, or race. Yet a court called on to appoint a guardian for
their children could not appropriately override the parents’ choice on the
grounds that, as an arm of the state, it must not involve itself in invidious
discrimination against certain potential guardians.74 In choosing on behalf
of children persons with whom they will form a new family relationship—a
kind of choice private individuals ordinarily are entitled to make for
themselves, the state necessarily acts in a parens patriae role, exclusively as a
fiduciary for the child.75 It could appropriately override the parents’ choice
only on the grounds that the choice is, given circumstances at the time of
appointment, contrary to the child’s welfare.
Thus, beyond the fact that the state is not constitutionally compelled to
accommodate the wishes of any group of adults seeking to become foster
parents, it should not even make such wishes part of its decision making. For
the state to concern itself with the interests of other parties in the course of
handling children it has taken into its custody detracts from its performance
of the parens patriae role and in some circumstances will be detrimental to
the children. It is a breach of the state’s fiduciary duty owed to the children
and contravenes the sole purpose justifying its infringement of the children’s

74

75

Cf. id. at 187 (presenting view of Brownstein that it is permissible for government agencies to
discriminate among adoption applicants based on sexual orientation if the birth parents ask them
to do so).
This distinguishes this (not so hypothetical) case from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), where the
Court acted not in a parens patriae but a police power role, adjudicating a dispute among
autonomous persons over property rights and the implications of a contract that had adverse effects
on third parties. It does not distinguish this case from Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)
(overturning award of custody to father that was motivated by hostility directed at a child in the
mother’s community because of her interracial relationship), which on this view was improperly
reasoned. See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 191–96 (2006).
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right against being seized and subjected to government control over
residence and intimate associations.
No one but foster children themselves, therefore, has any rights in
connection with foster care placements. These are simply surrogate decisions
for non-autonomous private persons, and no one would have a right to
participate in choices regarding a person’s temporary living arrangement if
the person were capable of making those choices for themselves.76 This
precludes ascription of rights to private agencies wishing to be involved in
recruiting and training or to individuals wishing to serve as foster parents.
Thus, courts in cases like Fulton, brought by faith-based agencies asserting
a First Amendment right against exclusion from foster care systems, should
dismiss those claims from the outset as simply impertinent, a category error,
reflecting a misunderstanding of the role that the state is fulfilling. The
governments in question owe no constitutional duty of non-discrimination or
accommodation to any private agencies.77 Analogously, if an abused woman
seeking temporary shelter refused to deal with a particular agency that assists
with finding such shelter, for the reason that the agency has a policy of
discriminating against shelters run by people who are gay, then that is that.
Such an agency has no right that she nevertheless deal with it because its
discrimination is grounded in religious belief. The same is true of proxy,
parens patriae decision making for an abused child. The First Amendment
simply does not apply.
Moreover, this conclusion about private foster-care agencies having no
right at stake would hold true even if government decision makers were
patently hostile to a particular agency’s religion. Imagine, for example, if the
City of Philadelphia decided to exclude some other private agency because
its religious beliefs led it to recruit only foster parents committed to instilling

76

77

Cf. Brief of Ohio Ass’n of Juv. Ct. Judges as Amicus Curiae at *8, In re Gault, 385 U.S. 965 (1966)
(No. 116), 1966 WL 100788 (“It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every enlightened
government, in its character of parens patriae, to protect and provide for the comfort and well-being
of such of its citizens as, by reason of infancy are unable to take care of themselves. The performance
of this duty is justly regarded as one of the most important of governmental functions, and all
constitutional limitations must be so understood and construed as not to interfere with its proper
and legitimate exercise.”).
Cf. Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706, 752 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“a state agency seeking to provide
child welfare services to wards of the State has no entitlement to a contract with the State to provide
those services: ‘Unlike unemployment benefits or the ability to hold office, a state contract for [child
welfare] services is not a public benefit [and] the State can[not] be required under the Free Exercise
Clause to contract with a religious organization.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Teen Ranch v.
Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (W.D. Mich. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, 479
F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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in foster children the view that females are inherently inferior to males and
that a woman’s only proper role in adult life is to serve a husband and
children. And suppose there was ample evidence of City decision makers
denigrating, ridiculing, and despising adherents to that religion. The City’s
decision would be appropriate despite that hostility, that agency would have
no cognizable First Amendment or other constitutional claim against the
City, and the City should not need to justify the impact of its decision on that
agency.
At the same time, no one has a right that the state, acting in its parens
patriae role, include them in the pool of potential foster parents for any
particular child. The foster care system, contrary to what many amici in
Fulton suggested,78 is not for the benefit of people who wish to be foster
parents. When the state takes a given child into custody, its decision about
foster placement for that individual child and the process it follows to make
foster homes available for that child should focus exclusively on what overall
is best for that child. No concern for the impact of its decisions on any
adults—not even “grave stigmatic harms”79—should distract the state from
that focus. Nor should the state’s general interest in promoting social equality
among groups of adults play any role. Thus, were the state routinely to pass
over Christian Scientists who have offered themselves as foster parents (as
some state agencies might well already do), on the grounds that they cannot
be trusted to report medical problems with a child, that would not even
infringe any right of those Christian Scientists, so they would have no
colorable constitutional claim on their own behalf against that practice, no
basis for demanding accommodation of their beliefs or justification for not
accommodating. Any suit they file asserting their own rights should be
immediately dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. If they believe the exclusion bad for children, they can complain
about it as an infringement of rights of the children.
All who have weighed in on the foster care cases would likely
acknowledge the appropriateness of tolerating discrimination for the sake of
children’s overall wellbeing in other contexts—for example, selecting
particular foster parents for a child because they are of the same religion as

78

79

See, e.g., Brief of Prospective Foster Parents, supra note 25, at 21 (“It is the children in foster care and
the prospective foster parents who wish to provide them with loving homes who are the recipients,
the beneficiaries, the participants.”).
Id. at 30; see also Dumont, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 720 (noting that Plaintiffs alleged stigmatic injury).

June 2022]

SMITH'S LAST STAND?

883

the child or the child’s parents,80 or because the applicants are a same-sex
couple and the child identifies as gay. In those instances as well, the
government would be discriminating in favor of some foster parents and
against others, on the basis of religion and sexual orientation—something the
government in its police power role is presumptively forbidden from doing,
and it would be directing public money (the foster care stipend) to some
people pursuant to a contract with them knowing they might have attitudes
government actors are not supposed to have (e.g., viewing persons of other
faiths or of no faith as benighted or worse). Yet people involved in foster care
generally deem that appropriate, because they see it as consistent with
children’s interests.81 Implicitly, they recognize that the state operates in a
different capacity than normal when making choices on behalf of a child in
its custody.
Thus, to the extent governments that have ejected Catholic or other
agencies from their child welfare systems have defended their actions by
invoking supposed equal protection rights or interests of same-sex couples or
gay individuals, and insofar as commentators have done so as well,82 they
have been mistaken. They have misunderstood the government’s role in the
lives of maltreated children. That some religious agency’s participation in
the foster care system might have some “social and dignitary impact” on
LGBTQ+ adults is unfortunate but normatively irrelevant. One might also
contend that, given the facts in Philadelphia, claims about such impact were
exaggerated.83 CSS was only one of thirty or so agencies and was never
80
81
82

83

Cf. 11 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 31 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (mandating
placement of child in foster home of same religion as parents when possible).
Brief of Prospective Foster Parents, supra note 25, at 21.
See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 687 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting the Mayor
of Philadelphia as saying “we cannot use taxpayer dollars to fund organizations that discriminate
against people because of their sexual orientation or because of their same-sex marriage status . . . .
It’s just not right.”); Brief of Prospective Foster Parents, supra note 25, at 25 (“Government always
has a paramount interest in preventing discrimination in the administration of public programs and
the provision of government services.”); Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 25, at 18–19
(arguing against exemptions to non-discrimination rules on the ground that they prevent “social
and dignitary harms” to certain prospective foster parents); Brief for Amici Curiae President of
House of Deputies of Episcopal Church et al. in Support of Respondents & Affirmance at 12, Fulton
v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123) (arguing that “[p]articular religious
perspectives on civil marriage and family should not . . . deny a protected class of otherwise qualified
persons the opportunity to be foster parents.”).
Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al. in Support of Respondents & Affirmance at
15, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123) (quoting Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015)) (“When discrimination ‘becomes enacted law and public
policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that
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approached by a same-sex couple, the City retains ultimate authority over
placements and does not itself discriminate, and the City tells prospective
applicants up front to search for an agency best suited to them. 84 But the
essential point is that the impact on anyone other than the children is
irrelevant.
Likewise, invoking corporate societal interests such as avoiding
“embarrassment and inconvenience to citizens and visitors of the City” and
promoting the “economic growth of the City”—which might actually have
been the core motivation for the City’s action—is inappropriate.85 So, too,
with ensuring taxpayers can benefit from services for which they indirectly
pay,86 and generally “eradicating discrimination.”87 Such objectives are
pertinent to state decision making in a police power role, but not in a parens
patriae function such as foster care. For the City and the courts to apply a
law enacted to further interests in tourism and business development to the
City’s foster care system—that is, to its function as custodians and caretakers
for children who have suffered abuse and neglect, is beyond inappropriate;
it is condemnable. Yet lower courts in Fulton deemed these also legitimate
bases for the City’s action.88
Only one of the numerous justifications Philadelphia offered in the lower
courts was specific to foster care and resembled a child-welfare rationale:
“[I]n the context of foster care and adoption, [the City’s Department of
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soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.’ Constitutionalizing the ability
to exclude same-sex couples . . . perpetuates demeaning stereotypes . . . .”).
See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1875 (“No same-sex couple has ever sought certification from CSS. If one
did, CSS would direct the couple to one of the more than 20 other agencies in the City, all of which
currently certify same-sex couples. For over 50 years, CSS successfully contracted with the City to
provide foster care services while holding to these beliefs.”). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.124e(1)(b)-(d) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (“[T]here are 105 licensed adoption
and foster care agencies in this state” and they “represent a broad spectrum of organizations and
groups, some of which are faith based and some of which are not faith based”); Dumont, 341 F.
Supp. 3d at 715 (“DHHS retains ultimate supervisory responsibility in all cases”
Fulton, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 683; see also id. at 684–85 (citing the City’s interests in ensuring “that when
contractors agree to terms in a government contract, the contractors adhere to those terms,” “that
when its contractors voluntarily agree to be bound by local laws, the local laws are enforced,” “that
when they employ contractors to provide governmental services, the services are accessible to all
Philadelphians who are qualified for the services,” and that it avoid “likely Equal Protection Clause
and Establishment Clause claims” that would arise if it allowed some contractors to discriminate).
Id. at 685.
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 163 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating “[i]t is black-letter law that
‘eradicating discrimination’ is a compelling interest” and citing in support a precedent addressing
police power legislation); see also id. at 164 (internal citation omitted) (“The harm is not merely that
gay foster parents will be discouraged from fostering. It is the discrimination itself.”).
Fulton, 922 F.3d at 165; Fulton, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 683–85, 703–04.
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Human Services (“DHS”] and Philadelphia have a legitimate interest in
ensuring that the pool of foster parents and resource caregivers is as diverse
and broad as the children in need of foster parents and resource
caregivers.”89 Yet the district court devoted no space to determining whether
exclusion of CSS actually furthers that interest, or any of the other asserted
interests. Given the posture of the case at that point (a motion for immediate,
temporary injunctive relief) and the generally undemanding nature of
rational basis review, the court simply noted that, in light of the multiple
supposedly legitimate interests asserted, CSS’s challenge was unlikely
ultimately to succeed.90 Most of the factual dispute was instead about
whether the City’s decision manifested particular hostility to religious, or
more specifically Catholic, organizations, which might have triggered a more
demanding scrutiny of the City’s action, and whether CSS’s exercise of
religion was substantially burdened.91 This is a clear example of just how
distorted analysis of child-welfare matters becomes when the state’s role is
misunderstood and rights are mistakenly ascribed to adults and their
organizations.
Importantly, erasing the rights of agencies and potential foster parents
from the equation does not leave the issue one of mere policy choice. As
noted above, children, like adults, have Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights against the state’s taking them into its custody, and the state may
justifiably infringe that right of a child only if and insofar as the state does it
out of necessity to protect and promote the child’s wellbeing. Contrariwise,
it is generally not constitutionally permissible for the state to seize a person
and then use the person to serve interests of other persons or of society
collectively.92 Moreover, this right we all have against the state seizing us is
a fundamental one, and so courts should apply a relatively demanding level
of review to state action that infringes the right. Thus, if permitting CSS to
continue operating as one agency among many is on the whole good for
children whom the City takes into custody, because it generates a net increase
89
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Id.
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 683, 686–90; see also Fulton, 922 F.3d at 156–59, 163.
The familiar exceptions are incarceration to protect the public and conscription to protect the
country, and their special justifications obviously do not apply to seizure of children whose welfare
has been rendered fragile by parental abuse and neglect. The Supreme Court has at times taken
the position that minors have less interest against seizure by the state, because they are always in
somebody’s custody, but it has justified its own greater incursions on minors’ liberty relative to
adults’ liberty by reference to the government’s responsibility to protect youth, Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 263 (1984), and it has never suggested that this means the state may use children in its
possession instrumentally.
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in quantity and quality of available foster homes, and detrimental to no
children, then that is what the City should do, and no other parties should
be deemed to have a right to stop this.93
One might wonder how such a right of children would ever be
enforced—that is, how would such a complaint against a government, when
it makes a decision relating to foster care that is contrary to the welfare of
foster children, ever come before a court? Typically, juvenile courts appoint
a legal representative for any child whom the state takes into protective
custody, but challenging policies is generally not within the scope of the
representative’s duties. There are two mechanisms, however, for an agency
or individual to bring suit in federal court on behalf of children—third-party
standing and “next friend” representation—which are especially wellreceived when children are in state custody and cut off from family support.94
CSS could have challenged Philadelphia’s exclusion of it as a violation of
children’s rights by one of those means. If the City now amends its contracts
to eliminate discretionary exemptions from non-discrimination requirements
or amends its public accommodation ordinance to make it explicitly
applicable to foster care, and then attempts to exclude CSS again, CSS
should mount a challenge on this child-centered basis in a second round of
litigation. Another possibility, which already exists in some states, is
empowerment of an ombudsperson for children to bring suit challenging
government actions violative of children’s rights.95
Many will find this view, that no one but the child has any rights at stake
in these heated controversies over foster care and adoption, difficult to accept
as applied to one party or the other. However, if one accepts it as to one
party then one should accept it as to the other as well. In both cases, it is
based on the same principle—that is, that the state operates solely in a parens
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Cf. Brief for Voice for Adoption et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Fulton v.
City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123) (“[G]overnmental child welfare agencies,
including Philadelphia’s, are obligated to continue to adopt, follow, and enforce policies that are in
the best interests of the children they serve.”).
In limited circumstances, persons or organizations may initiate a lawsuit in federal court asserting
constitutional rights of others—for example, when the former stand in such a relationship with the
latter that the former’s interests are impacted by infringements of the latter’s rights. See, e.g., Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (white property owners precluded by restrictive covenant from
selling to Black persons may assert the latter’s rights). In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(c)(2) allows any appropriate persons to file suit against the state as “next friend” representative
of one or more children, asserting rights of the children.
See
Children’s
Ombudsman
Offices,
NAT’L
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGIS.,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/childrens-ombudsman-offices.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P5KM-P28R] (last visited May 31, 2022).
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patriae role when securing foster care and adoptive placements for individual
children. Some consolation for both sides, should courts adopt the view
advanced here, would come from the fact that it entails ascribing to the state
a duty owed to each child to act in the child’s best interests. Both sides in
these disputes confidently assert that children’s interests are best served by
their getting what they want—that is, not contracting with agencies that have
discriminatory policies or not excluding an agency that, despite declining to
deal with same-sex married couples, is highly successful in recruiting,
preparing, and supporting a large number of high-quality foster homes for
children. Those are the correct sorts of arguments to make in this context,
but they should support an argument about rights of children rather than
about rights of adults. Religious agencies should be arguing that
governments are violating children’s constitutional rights by illicitly injecting
concern for same-sex couples into their fulfillment of the parens patriae role.
The LGBTQ+ community should be arguing that governments’ parens
patriae duty to do what is best for children compels them to exclude from
participation in the program any agency that on the whole unduly diminishes
the pool of potential foster parents available to children in their care. Framed
as such, there would be no disagreement between the parties on legal issues,
the outcome should turn purely on factual determinations, and so the case
would never reach the Supreme Court, which generally does not take cases
to review findings of fact. The final Part below sorts out the competing
factual claims, which the Fulton Court only cursorily addressed.
IV. APPLYING THE PROPER FRAMEWORK
How should these cases be resolved? Was it proper, from a childcentered perspective, as opposed to the adults-rights perspective of the courts
in Fulton, for the City of Philadelphia to refuse to renew CSS’s contract? In
this and any similar situation, in Philadelphia or other jurisdictions where
private agencies are used, the answer is highly fact dependent, and it is
unlikely anyone who does not understand how child protection and foster
care systems work could accurately assess the evidence.96 The Supreme
96

See, e.g., Netta Barak-Corren & Nelson Tebbe, Does Harm Result When Religious Placement Agencies Close
Their Doors? New Empirical Evidence from the Case of Boston Catholic Charities, BALKANIZATION (Oct. 27,
2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/10/does-harm-result-when-religious.html
[https://perma.cc/N5AU-VKK5] (blog post by two law professors who are not specialists in child
welfare law and policy, who previously advocated on other grounds for an outcome favorable to
the City in Fulton, claiming to draw inferences about the impact of one agency’s departure from
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Court’s treatment of the facts was correct but cursory, so this Part offers a
more thorough explanation of why ordering Philadelphia to renew CSS’s
contract is best for foster children in that city, and it suggests which different
circumstances in other jurisdictions might yield a different conclusion.
A child-centered assessment of whether it is proper to include in the foster
care system private agencies that discriminate on certain bases could depend
in part on how the process for matching children with foster parents works—
in particular, whether the public agency overseeing the system itself selects
the foster parents for each child from among all whom the private agencies
have made available or instead leaves that decision to each private agency
with respect to any children whom the public agency channels to it. The
Court of Appeals opinion in Fulton suggested Philadelphia takes a hybrid
approach, under which the public agency refers a child to a private agency,
and then the latter selects a placement with foster parents from among those
whom the private agency has recruited and trained, but subject to the public
agency’s power to veto the private agency’s choice and to transfer a child at
any time to a different private agency in order to secure a more appropriate
placement.97 CSS’s brief to the Supreme Court, on the other hand, states
that DHS chooses as to each child, after informing all the private agencies
about a given child just taken into custody and asking the private agencies
what foster parents they have available.98 The Supreme Court majority
adopted the latter depiction.99 Whether the public agency’s supervision of
placements is robust or nominal might affect one’s assessment of the
plausibility of numerous assertions that the involvement of religious agencies
with discriminatory policies reduces the number of foster homes available to
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Philadelphia’s foster-care program in 2018 from: a) interviews with a couple of former employees of
an adoption agency (a quite different operation) that ceased operations in Boston thirteen years
earlier, and b) state-wide data on children’s average time spent in foster care, with no explanation
of how that data reflects the quantity or quality of foster homes and no recognition of the numerous
factors that influence such figures, which can vary greatly from year to year and place to place).
For the perspective of someone familiar with foster care systems, see David Smolin, Setting the Record
Straight: Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, MIRROR OF JUST. (Jan. 23, 2021),
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2021/01/setting-the-record-straight-fulton-vcity-of-philadelphia.html [https://perma.cc/3TGZ-EJ57].
Fulton, 922 F.3d at 147 (“Once the City refers a child to an agency, that agency selects an
appropriate foster parent for the child, although Human Services can oppose a child’s placement
with a particular foster parent if necessary.”).
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 27, at 6.
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1875.
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children.100 Most likely, though, regardless of how the process works in
practice, in Philadelphia or elsewhere, those assertions are false and, in fact,
the opposite is true.
Supposing a public agency’s control of placements is merely nominal, so
that a child assigned to a particular private agency, such as CSS, would be
put in whatever placement the private agency chooses, from among the foster
parents it has recruited and approved, there would be concern that the
private agency’s discrimination reduces the pool available to each such child.
This would be problematic, because the state’s fiduciary obligation extends
to each child individually. As to any given child Philadelphia takes into
custody and assigns to CSS, the pool of available foster homes would be
diminished to an extent by exclusion of same-sex couples. CSS has
emphasized that no same-sex couple ever approached it,101 but that is
meaningless if it is so simply because everyone knows of CSS’s policy, as is
likely true.102 If same-sex couples make up a substantial percentage of all
persons who wish to be foster parents, this would be a significant limitation
that, in and of itself, would be contrary to the welfare of a child assigned to
CSS, because likely to lower the average quality of care.103

100

101
102

103

See, e.g., Brief of Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al., supra note 85, at 14; Brief of Children’s Rts. et al.,
supra note 29, at 20 (emphasis in original) (“CSS’s refusal to certify same-sex couples as foster parents
hurts all children because it unnecessarily narrows the pool of prospective parents.”); id. at 24
(“Allowing discriminatory practices undermines the availability of suitable family-based settings for
children in foster care and puts youth at increased risk of institutional placement.”); Brief of
Prospective Foster Parents, supra note 25, at 25 (“Allowing contractors to shrink this already-tooshallow pool by imposing religious tests is contrary to the City’s duties and the children’s needs.”);
Brief of Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al., supra, at 17; Brief of Baptist Joint Comm. for Religious Liberty
et al., supra note 29, at 18; Brief of Support Ctr. for Child Advocates, supra note 29, at 2–4; Brief for
Voice for Adoption, supra note 94, at 2; Movement Advancement Project, Child Welfare League of
Am., & Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers, Kids Pay the Price: How Religious Exemptions for Child Welfare
Services
Harm
Children,
MOVEMENT
ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT
(Sept.
2017),
https://www.lgbtmap.org/kids-pay-the-price-report [https://perma.cc/K74Q-AR4X]; see also
Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706, 717–18 (D. Mich. 2018) (“Plaintiffs allege that the loss of
these potentially qualified families exacerbates the shortage of potential foster and adoptive families.
. . .”).
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 21, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19123).
See Brief for Nebraska et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 32, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123) (“the organization’s views on marriage are well
known . . . as evidenced by the absence of any same-sex couple ever applying to foster through
Catholic Social Services”).
See, e.g., Brief of Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al., supra note 85, at 12 (“In Massachusetts, for example,
between fifteen and twenty-eight percent of adoptions from foster care each year over a ten-year
period involved same-sex parents.”); Brief of Children’s Rts. et al., supra note 29, at 23–24.
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However, there is good reason to believe any such lowering of quality
inherent in CSS’s exclusion of one category of applicants would be more than
outweighed by several virtues CSS displays, and this could be true with
particular private agencies in other locales as well. CSS asserted, and no one
denied, that it has an extraordinary ability to recruit, train, support, and
retain excellent foster parents.104 Its success appears to reflect at least four
things. First, it has over a century of experience.105 Second, as a robustly
Catholic entity affiliated with the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, it is uniquely
situated to reach the huge Catholic population in that metropolitan area—
for example, by working closely with local parish leaders to solicit
congregation members.106 Third, a faith-based devotion to service pervades
its work and the lives of Catholic families in the Philadelphia area that it
recruits.107 That is an important element of initial commitment to and
continuation of fostering despite its serious challenges.108 Numerous
anecdotes in briefs filed in support of CSS attested to the special character of
CSS’s work and of agencies like them in other parts of the country, and of
104

105
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See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 27, at 5; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Former Foster Child. &
Foster Parents & Cath. Found. at 1–20, Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19123) (relating stories of foster homes that received extraordinary support from CSS).
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019).
Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Foster Child. & Foster Parents & Cath. Found., supra note 105,
at 19 (stating that for many potential foster families, a necessary condition for their enrollment and
continuation is that they are dealing with an agency of their faith, sharing their pastoral outlook);
see also id. at 25–26.
See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 147 (“As an affiliate of the Catholic Church, CSS sees caring for vulnerable
children as a core value of the Christian faith and therefore views its foster care work as part of its
religious mission and ministry.”). Cf. Judy Fenster, Race, Religion, Altruism, and the Transracial Adoption
Debate: A Survey of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish Social Workers, 22 SOCIAL THOUGHT 45, 57 (2003)
(finding “Whites who view themselves as more altruistic tend to have more positive attitudes toward
transracial adoption than those who view themselves as less altruistic. . . . Among whites, Catholic
respondents were more altruistic than were either Protestant respondents (p= .033) or Jewish
respondents (p= .009).”); Naomi Schaefer Riley, Bureaucrats Are Ripping Foster Families Apart, NAT’L
REV. (Oct. 29, 2020) (discussing reasons for CSS’s success and citing research finding foster parents
recruited and supported by faith-based agencies last on average 2.6 years longer than other foster
parents).
See Brief of Nebraska et al., supra note 103, at 3 (“By appealing to prospective foster parents based
on a shared religious calling, faith-based groups have been particularly effective at recruiting foster
parents. And by providing strong community support based on a common faith, those
organizations have excelled at retaining foster parents for the long haul. In addition, foster parents
who work with faith-based agencies tend to perform well, foster more children, and volunteer for
some of the most difficult placements.”), 11 (“because fostering children is difficult work, people
often require a deep level of comfort and support before they commit to the task”), 12 (“religious
foster-care organizations excel at recruiting and retaining a diverse roster of first-rate foster
parents”), 13 (“recruitment through religious groups like churches is “particularly influential . . .
with African-Americans.”), 16–17 (noting very high turnover rate because of burnout, which CSS
is especially effective at countering with spiritual, emotional, practical, and material support).
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the homes they provide children. One need not be Catholic or religious at
all to appreciate the value this faith element adds. Fourth, CSS and other
Catholic organizations fully support trans-racial foster care arrangements
and adoptions,109 making them especially attractive to white applicants who
wish to foster as a possible pathway to adoption, as well as to applicants of
other races.110 In contrast, an ideology hostile to trans-racial adoption
pervades many public foster-care agencies—in particular, those in large

109

110

Cf. Br. Pet. 5 (“CSS serves all children in need, regardless of religion, race, sex, or sexual
orientation.”); Fenster, supra note 108, at 55 (finding stronger support for trans-racial adoption
among Catholic social workers than among Protestant social workers), 59 (speculating that
“explanation for Catholic support of TRA may lie in the influence of Catholic religious teaching,
which is fervently anti-abortion”), id. at 59 (citing prior study finding parents who chose to adopt
transracially scored higher on a scale of altruism than those who adopted same-race children);
Samuel L. Perry, Contact, Congregations, and Children of Color: The Effects of Interracial Contact in Religious
Settings on Whites’ Attitudes Toward Transracial Adoption, 42 J. COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES 851–
69 (2011) (likewise finding support for trans-racial adoption higher among Catholics than among
Protestants, and also that degree of religiosity correlates positively with support for TRA). Many
Catholic adoption agencies, though not posting online an explicit policy statement on transracial
adoption, depict an interracial adoption on their web homepage. See, e.g., CATH. SOC. SERV. OF
PHILA., http://adoption-phl.org/ [https://perma.cc/RCK8-VZYE] (last visited May 31, 2022);
“Adopt a Child,” CATH. CHARITIES DIOCESE OF ARLINGTON, https://www.ccda.net/needhelp/pregnancy-and-adoption/adopt-a-child/ [https://perma.cc/6G4Y-2WFP] (last visited May
31, 2022); CATH. CHARITIES DIOCESE OF E. VA., https://cceva.org/adoption/
[https://perma.cc/UQ5Z-X8VE] (last visited May 31, 2022).
Cf. Samuel L. Perry, The Effects of Race, Religion, and Religiosity on Attitudes Toward Transracial Adoption,
41 J. COMPAR. FAM. STUD. 837–54 (2010) (finding level of religiosity positively correlated with
support for trans-racial adoption).
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urban areas,111 likely including Philadelphia,112 and undoubtedly also infects
some non-Catholic private agencies. Together these four virtues likely made
both the number and the average quality of foster homes CSS provided to
children in Philadelphia on the whole, and despite its exclusion of same-sex
couples, significantly higher than what would be available to children in the
absence of CSS’s participation.113 Many anecdotes in the briefs filed in the
case support that conclusion, as does public agencies’ experience with faithbased organizations in many other jurisdictions.114
111

112

113
114

Cf. Riley, Bureaucrats Are Ripping Foster Families Apart, supra note 108; Fenster, supra note 108, at 22
(finding “black social workers, on average, manifested a relatively unfavorable attitude toward
transracial adoption, whereas the white social workers, on average, manifested a relatively favorable
attitude”); id. at 58 (citing a prior study finding the same result by race among the general
population); id. at 60 (“altruistic impulses may play a lesser or insignificant role in black social
workers’ views of transracial adoption”); A.R.L. v. Norfolk Dept. Hum. Serv., 4:20-cv-00110 (E.D.
Va. 2020) (alleging violation of the Inter-Ethnic Placement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1)(B) (1996),
which prohibits race matching); Diane Bernard, A White Couple, A Mixed-Race Baby and A Forbidden
Adoption, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2019; Ralph Richard Banks, The Multiethnic Placement Act and The
Troubling Persistence of Race Matching, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 271, 274 (2009); Susan K. Livio & Mary Jo
Patterson, The Colors of Love: Outside Walls and Warmth of a Happy Home, Debate Swirls About Crossing the
Racial Divide, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), Dec. 27, 2005, at 1 (“We heard it over and over, there were
social workers who were engaging in the systematic race-matching of kids. African-American
children would be available, but they wouldn’t be made available if the homes belonged to white
parents, . . .”); Nat’l Ass’n of Black Soc. Workers (“NABSW”), Preserving Families of African Ancestry 4
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nabsw.org/resource/collection/0D2D2404-77EB-49B5-962E7E6FADBF3D0D/Preserving_Families_of_African_Ancestry.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EDMC8RT] (urging repeal of the federal Inter-Ethnic Placement Act because it prohibits race
matching); NABSW, Position Statement on Trans-Racial Adoptions, Sept. 1972, 1 (statement by
organization for Black social workers, who make up most of the staff of child welfare agencies in
urban areas with large Black population, from which it has never retreated, declaring its “vehement
stand against the placement of Black children in white homes for any reason”).
Cf. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 158 (noting and not rejecting CSS’s contention that the City’s “Human
Services will consider factors such as race or disability when placing foster children with foster
parents.”); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 27, at 13 (“Philadelphia considers disability and race
when making foster placements. J.A.305-316.”). The Court of Appeals’ response that
“consideration of race or disability when placing a foster child” does not mean that the public
agency “refuses to work with individuals because of their membership in a protected class” is
questionable. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 158. If that agency engages in categorical race matching, and if
one looks at the matter in terms of its decision as to a particular black child; a categorical racematching policy would amount, in connection with that child, to refusing to work with non-black
applicants.
See Brief of Nebraska et al., supra note 103, at 17 (reporting 50% drop in non-relative foster homes
in Illinois after the state chose to exclude several faith-based foster care agencies).
See id. at 14–15 (discussing survey in Arkansas finding “36 percent of foster parents recruited
through the CALL said that they would not have become foster parents without the group’s work,
and 40 percent were not sure”) (citing Michael Howell-Moroney, On the Effectiveness of Faith-Based
Partnerships in Recruitment of Foster and Adoptive Parents, 19 J. OF PUB. MGMT. & SOC. POL’Y 168, 176–
77 (2013)); id. at 15 (“[S]ome people of faith cannot commit to the demanding task of fostering
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Analogously, a contracting agency might choose not to deal with
potential foster parents who do not speak English or who are deaf and only
use sign language—also characteristics of no inherent relevance to capability
as caregivers.115 It might do so because it is unable to accommodate the need
for translation in every aspect of recruiting, training, and supporting. As a
result, such an agency will draw from a smaller pool and the average quality
will therefore be less than what it would be absent the discrimination. And
any agency’s discrimination on a linguistic basis might be just as likely to
discourage a group of people as discrimination based on sexual orientation
allegedly does. Yet it might well be that the public agency would be wise to
contract with that private agency anyway, because on balance it does a
terrific job providing a large pool of high-quality foster homes. Yet on the
view advanced by Philadelphia and most of the amici in Fulton, it should be
assumed bad for children that a public agency contracts with any private
agency that excludes any significant number of parents on any basis that
inherently is “unrelated to parenting ability” or suitability.116 That it is quite
irrational.
Conversely, exclusion of a highly successful private agency in and of itself
patently reduces significantly the total number of foster homes available to
children the state takes into custody, relative to what it would be if it
continued fully to include that agency, for the reasons noted above. CSS, as
a Catholic agency affiliated with the local Catholic archdiocese, can better
reach the fourth of Pennsylvania’s adult population that is Catholic.117 No
other agency capable of doing that has stepped into the breach left by CSS’s
departure.
The federal district court found, apparently just on the basis of one City
official’s testimony, that excluding CSS did not result in more children
entering congregate care or spending time in DHS’s “childcare room”—that
is, a non-family facility for children for whom foster families have not yet
been located.118 But even if that uncorroborated testimony is accurate, it

115
116
117

118

children—work they consider central to their religion—if they are unable to partner with an
organization that shares their beliefs”); id. at 18–19 (citing research finding that religiouslymotivated foster parents are on average more altruistic, more highly regarded, and more willing to
take in the highest-need children than others).
Cf. Cert. Petition, 6 (“Some agencies specialize in serving the Latino community . . . .”); id. at 13
(noting referrals to agencies based on tribal affiliation or lack thereof of applicants).
Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 25, at 17.
See Adults in the Philadelphia Metro Area, PEW RSCH. CTR., https://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/metro-area/philadelphia-metro-area/ [https://perma.cc/7YYM-ETGN] (last
visited May 31, 2022).
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. 661, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
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would tell us nothing about why numbers did not increase in congregate care
or the childcare room. In particular, it would not demonstrate that the
number or quality of foster homes available had remained constant.119
Someone familiar with child welfare systems would ask several questions
before attempting to draw any inference from the official’s testimony: Did
the agency simply remove far fewer children from their homes?120 Did it
divert more children to homes of relatives not certified as foster parents? Did
the federal Family First Act of 2018, which severely reduced funding for
congregate care, have an impact? Further, the testimony would not address
CSS’s point that whatever the current number of children in congregate care,
it could be significantly lower than that if the City continued to accept foster
homes recruited by CSS—this is, the contention presupposed the wrong
baseline.121
An additional concern with Catholic agencies’ policies and the beliefs
underlying them, however, is that the families they do recruit might share
their views about sexual orientation and so be bad placements for LGBTQ+
youth,122 who make up a disproportionate share of teens entering foster
care.123 Philadelphia appeared not to have that concern, because it decided
on child-welfare grounds to continue existing placements that CSS was
overseeing and to place additional children through CSS when necessary to
unite siblings.124 In any event, as discussed further below, any public child
protection agency ought to be, and presumably is, identifying such youth at
intake, just as they do or should identify children with disabilities or for whom
continuity of religious practice is important,125 and assigning them to
119

120
121

122
123

124
125

In Pennsylvania as a whole, the number of total homes (existing plus new) declined substantially
between 2018 and 2020, from nearly twenty thousand to less than fifteen thousand. See “Who
Cares—Pennsylvania,” THE IMPRINT, https://www.fostercarecapacity.com/states/pennsylvania
[https://perma.cc/GW34-6MZP] (last visited May 31, 2022).
Cf. id. (showing that the number of youth in foster care in Pennsylvania declined by about one
seventh from 2018 to 2020).
Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 102, at 22 (“Respondents have no answer for the 250 children
they admitted need to be moved out of institutions—but who won’t be placed in the empty homes
CSS can provide today.”).
See Brief for Voice for Adoption, supra note 94, at 2.
See Jordan Blair Woods, Religious Exemptions and LGBTQ Child Welfare, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2343,
2403–04 (2019) (citing two studies finding that roughly one in five adolescents in foster care are
LGBTQ+).
Fulton, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 673.
See Brief for Voice for Adoption et al., supra note 94, at 10 (“Under well-established child welfare
standards, [placing a child] involves matching the characteristics and needs of the child with the
strengths and capabilities of available foster parents.”). Cf. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6375 (requiring
local agencies to develop an individual service plan for each child they take into custody); 55 PA.
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agencies and homes best suited to meet their particular needs.126 State law
requires Philadelphia DHS also to monitor each child’s wellbeing and to
change placements if the initial one is inappropriate.127 Additionally, there
seems to be implicit in much of the advocacy for excluding discriminatory
faith-based agencies an unwarranted assumption that LGBTQ+ youth
assigned to any agency that has taken the non-discrimination pledge will be
in good hands, yet there is no basis for supposing that those other agencies
do anything to ensure all foster parents they recruit are welcoming to
LGBTQ+ youth or that such youth are assigned to same-sex fostering
couples or single gay persons.128 Nor is there any reason to suppose public
agency caseworkers overseeing placements in any jurisdiction are sensitive to
the needs of LGBTQ+ youth.129 There appears to be some scapegoating of
CSS and other faith-based agencies that distracts attention from a more
pervasive problem in which public agencies are likely complicit.
In sum, with respect to the facts of the Fulton case, it seems CSS made a
great number of high-quality homes available to children, many of which
likely would not have been brought into the system without CSS’s
involvement in recruiting and qualifying foster parents. The City’s action
cut off that supply and, if one assumes its choices of private agencies send
some signal to City residents about who is welcome as foster parents, signaled

126

127

128

129

CODE § 3700.64(a) (“The FFCA shall consider the following when assessing the ability of applicants
for approval as foster parents: . . . (b) (3) The applicant’s ability to care for children with special
needs, such as physical handicaps and emotional disturbances.”); 11 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 31 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (“It shall be the duty of the duty of the society,
to whom a commitment shall be made . . . to select, so far as it may be possible, families of the same
religious denomination as that to which the parents of children committed to its care shall belong.”).
Cf. 23 PA. STAT. § 6386(4) (mandating, in cases of positive toxicology detection in newborns,
“[i]dentification, informed by an assessment of the needs of the child . . . of the most appropriate
lead agency responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring a plan of safe care”).
See 23 PA. STAT. § 6372 (requiring each local public agency to be “vigilant of the status, well-being
and conditions under which a child is living and being maintained” and “[w]here the county agency
finds that the placement for any temporary or permanent custody, care or treatment is for any
reason inappropriate or harmful in any way to the physical or mental well-being of the child, it shall
take immediate steps to remedy these conditions including petitioning the court.”).
Cf. Woods, supra note 123, at 2348–49 (noting “the backdrop of a public welfare system that is
already fraught with LGBTQ-based inequalities and commonly fails LGBTQ youth in need of help
from the state—an especially vulnerable segment of the LGBTQ population. . . . LGBTQ youth
are more frequently rejected or unwanted by foster families, adoptive parents, and group homes
. . . [and] experience discrimination from child welfare providers and frontline caseworkers . . .
[and] suffer higher rates of physical, sexual, and verbal abuse in foster families and group homes.”).
Cf. id. at 2349 (“Many LGBTQ youth also experience discrimination from child welfare providers
and frontline caseworkers . . . .”).
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to Catholics that they are now unwelcome.130 It therefore likely eliminated
a substantial number of excellent potential placements for the children whom
the City takes into its custody. The City presented no evidence that it
replaced those potential homes with others of equal or better quality. And
its reasons for doing this appear principally to have been to serve interests of
a group of adults—namely, same-sex couples wishing to foster maltreated
children—and corporate interests like attracting tourists and businesses. It
showed no child-welfare necessity to its decision. The soundest conclusion is
therefore that the City violated its fiduciary obligation to the children in its
custody. It improperly stepped outside its proper role, treating children
instrumentally in the service of adult interests.
Now consider the situation when a public agency itself selects the
placement for each child, from among all those made available to it by
private agencies, as the Court assumed to be the case in Philadelphia.131 If,
as is true in Philadelphia and most other locations where these disputes have
arisen, there are many agencies who do welcome same-sex married couples,
then the claim that participation of one or two agencies who do not qualify
such couples diminishes supply is even more clearly fanciful. It must entail a
factual premise that the local government’s willingness to contract with an
agency that discriminates scares off many potential foster parents, so that
they decline to become foster parents at all through any private agency, and
that the number of people it scares off exceeds the number of foster parents
that private agency recruits that other agencies would not reach. The briefs
filed in support of Philadelphia in Fulton, though many expressed concern

130

131

See Brief of Nebraska et al.,, supra note 103, at 32 (“For the city to brand Catholic Social Services’
religious beliefs as discriminatory and compel the organization to close its foster-care ministry
impugns the faith that it and its fellow believers hold.”).
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 27, at 6 (“When DHS needs a foster home for a child, it sends
out a request, called a referral, to private agencies. These agencies check to see which foster families
are available, then notify DHS of any potential match. Agencies provide information about the
foster family, and DHS compares that with information about the foster child. DHS then
determines which private agency has the most suitable foster family, based upon factors including
race, age, family relationships, and disability. J.A.266-267, J.A.307-310, J.A.79-81. After DHS
makes that match, the child is placed with the foster family.”); Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note
102, at 11 (“Philadelphia places a child in a home. . . . Philadelphia made no such delegation and
instead, by law, `shall not authorize any placement’ until it makes its own independent
determination of the family’s qualifications. PHILA. CODE § 21-1801; see also J.A. 84-85, 98
(confirming Philadelphia does so). Philadelphia is reserving authority to make its own decision
about families.”).
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that this could happen,132 provided no evidence that it actually did.133
Certainly there is no evidence of any same-sex couple in Philadelphia being
“turned away” or “rejected” altogether upon applying to become foster
parents. The City sensibly encourages all potential foster parents to research
online the available private foster care agencies and find one that is a good
fit for them, in light of whatever agency priorities or specialization might
matter to them.134 That no same-sex couple has ever approached CSS
suggests this works well. For the same reasons, the claim that CSS’s
involvement in foster care reduces diversity within the pool of foster parents
is also fanciful.135 If there were any reality underlying the “scaring off”
concern, then one would expect the City to have provided evidence of an

132

133

134

135

See, e.g., Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 25, at 26 (“[E]ncountering such discrimination
might well discourage prospective foster parents from seeking out another agency after experiencing
a painful rejection”); Brief of Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al., supra note 85, at 14–15 (“If child
placement agencies receiving public funding were permitted to reject qualified same-sex couples, it
is likely that at least some qualified potential parents will not pursue foster parenting at all due to
the additional confusion atop a complex child welfare system that is already often unwelcoming to
same-sex couples.”); Brief of Children’s Rts. et al., supra note 29, at 28; Brief for Voice for Adoption
et al., supra note 94, at 15. The several amici who signed on to the National LGBT Bar Association
brief cite “a national survey of gay and lesbian adoptive parents [that] found that nearly half of the
respondents reported experiencing bias or discrimination from a child welfare worker or birth
family member during the adoption process.” Brief of Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al., supra, at 15; see
also Brief of Children’s Rts. et al., supra, at 27–28 (citing a “2019 study gathering data from hundreds
of LGBTQ adults who experienced disruptions in the adoption or foster care process [that]
concluded that anti-LGBTQ discrimination ‘may lead some LGBTQ people to abandon foster
care or adoption as a means of building their families’”). This evidence actually undermines the
claim that discriminatory recruiting agencies diminish the pool; it shows there are more direct
obstacles in the system that have nothing to do with recruiting agencies and that gay and lesbian
caregivers are overcoming those obstacles.
Cf. Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 102, at 23 (“States accommodating religious agencies like
CSS have not experienced a decline in LGBTQ fostering, but instead have seen that
accommodating religious providers creates win-win outcomes. Tex. Br. 24–29; Nebraska Br.10–
19.”); Brief of President of the House of Deputies of the Episcopal Church et al. at 12–16, Fulton
v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123) (demonstrating that “The Inherent
Dignity Of LGBT Persons And Their Families Informs The Theology Of A Wide Cross-Section
Of American Religious Traditions”).
See Petition For a Writ of Certiorari 7 (noting Philadelphia tells potential foster families to research
agencies based on comfort and fit); see also Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706, 716 (E.D. Mich.
2018) (stating that faith-based agencies in Michigan, like CSS, refer to other agencies any applicants
with whom they cannot, for reasons of religious belief, work); New Hope Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Poole,
493 F. Supp. 3d 44, 51 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Complaint at 156, New Hope Fam. Servs., 493 F.
Supp. 3d 44 (No. 18-CV-1419) (“Whenever a same-sex couple or unmarried couple is interested in
a referral, New Hope refers them to the appropriate county social services officer or another
provider.”).
Brief of Family Equal. & PFLAG Nat’l at 33, Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No.
19-123); Brief of Support Ctr. for Child Advoc. & Phila. Family Pride at 2–3, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2020) (No. 19-123); Brief of Child. Rts. et al. at 16–17.
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increase in applications from same-sex couples as a result of CSS’s exit, but
it did not. And if there were any reality to the concern, the City might
address it by other means, such as special outreach to the gay community
emphasizing its own openness and that of numerous private agencies,136
rather than by cutting off a major supplier of high-quality homes for children,
which might reduce diversity within the pool in different ways (e.g., religious,
national origin).
Absent such a scaring off and inability to address the concern by other
means, courts should assume the agencies who agree to a non-discrimination
policy fully accommodate all the same-sex couples interested in fostering.137
For state agencies to have a “sufficient pool” of foster parents who are
“welcoming of LGBTQ youth,”138 they do not need every single private
agency with whom they contract to be recruiting such foster parents.
Similarly, they do not need every single private agency to recruit foster
parents well-suited to dealing with any other special need some foster
children might have—for example, foster parents fluent in particular
languages, or specially trained to manage behavior disorders or allergies, or
dedicated to the continuity of observance in every religion. Thus, if this other
assignment mechanism is at work, the net effect of excluding a private agency
that has been highly successful is again most likely to diminish the total foster
parent pool in quantity and quality, to the detriment of children.139 This
surmise is strengthened when one considers the possibility that excluding
Catholic agencies because of their faith-based position on marriage will
“scare off” Catholics from pursuing service as foster parents, because they
perceive exclusion of CSS as manifesting general hostility to Catholics.
Of course, in some other locality, or with respect to special types of foster
homes, circumstances might be different. One can hypothesize a situation

136

137

138
139

Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.124e(4) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess.) (prescribing special
efforts to welcome into the system any applicants not accepted by some private agency for religious
reasons).
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. 661, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“Presently, DHS has
contracts with thirty private foster care agencies.”); Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 25, at
29 (“In the Amici States, the vast majority of foster care and adoptive services providers, including
faith-based organizations, readily comply with inclusionary policies that disallow discrimination in
these services . . . .”).
Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 25, at 23.
The response that amici states supporting the City give to this speculation is illogical. Claiming that
no data supported the suggestion that Illinois experienced a “precipitous decline in foster homes”
after the state imposed a non-discrimination rule that caused Catholic Charities Illinois to cease
foster-care operations, the states argue there is no connection between those two things because
“such declines were not unique to Illinois,” a glaring non sequitur. Id. at 31.
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in which another private agency that is, except for the discriminatory policy,
identical to the agency excluded—in particular, having like access to the
same population—stands ready to jump into the breach left by the
discriminating agency’s departure and fully replicate its efforts. Then it
might be consistent with the state’s fiduciary role to exclude the
discriminatory agency, if the replacement possibility made that agency
entirely superfluous, to ensure no scaring off of same-sex couples. There is
no evidence, however, that that is the case in Philadelphia with respect to
CSS or in the other locations where the disputes have arisen. Conversely,
one can also hypothesize a situation in which an agency like CSS is the only
private agency in a town and refusing to give it a contract would dramatically
diminish the foster care population in size and quality. The local government
agency might find it very difficult to create its own foster care recruitment
function, or to recruit as many foster families as the private agency does. In
addition, the local government agency might have its own biases—in
particular, it might be inclined to engage in covert, illegal race-matching that
excludes white applicants from consideration for placement of Black
children—140 whereas the Catholic agency might be free of that bias.
Respondents and the many amici who support them should explain why it
would be morally or constitutionally requisite for the local government to
refuse to use that agency even though that refusal is, all things considered,
bad for children entering foster care. Having only that one agency would be
non-ideal for children, to be sure, because some great potential foster parents
(same-sex couples) are excluded, but the fix for that problem would be even
worse for children, just as would be the case if the only agency in town left
out some other group of potential foster parents (e.g., deaf, non-English
speakers, physically disabled, etc.). The parens patriae nature of the
government’s role in the foster care context means that it owes the children
in its custody an obligation to create the best total pool of foster homes that
it reasonably can in given circumstances, in light of existing resources,
without concern for its impact on other private individuals. In Philadelphia
140

Cf. Dov Fox, Race Sorting in Family Formation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 57, 60–61 (2015) (“In adoption, the
overriding emphasis on parent-child racial continuity undermines the placement of children with
stable families who love them. Minority children are vastly overrepresented among those without
homes, while minority parents are vastly underrepresented among those in a position to provide a
permanent home. The insistence that children be placed with parents of the same race predictably
leaves thousands of minority children, who might otherwise be placed with families of a different
race, languishing in foster care as their chances diminish for ever being adopted at all. Racematching in adoption is pernicious because it entrenches racial disparities among families by
singling out minority children for exclusion from stable homes and deprivation of enduring parental
relationships.”).
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and in many other locales, that appears to mean allowing private foster-care
agencies to continue operating as they have been even if they have faithbased or pragmatic reasons for not accepting some category of applicants.
I close by addressing a few additional arguments voiced in support of
Philadelphia in Fulton, not addressed by the Court in its decision but
potentially considered on a future occasion, depending on which level of
scrutiny courts apply:
Exemptions are inefficient:141 In carrying out its functions, it is
appropriate for a public agency to consider budget constraints and what
practices are most efficient. Exemptions and tailoring of contracts typically
entail some loss of efficiency and raise costs (though perhaps less so than does
terminating relationships with existing contractors and developing new
relationships with others, or than does auditing private agencies to ensure
their signing of a non-discrimination pledge is not disingenuous). If no one
has any rights constraining the government, then it is free to balance
competing considerations as it sees best. But this Article has explained why
children the government takes into its custody do have rights that constrain
it, fundamental rights in fact. Ordinarily, such an efficiency concern cannot
suffice to compromise a fundamental right, at least when the added cost is
modest, hardly crippling. In addition, governments can obviate this
efficiency concern simply by returning to the regime in which they did not
treat foster care as a public accommodation subject to anti-discrimination
rules.
Agency discretion. Courts should defer to some degree to the
judgement of specialized public agencies as to how best to carry out their
mission. In Philadelphia and other jurisdictions, however, the public
agencies have clearly misunderstood their mission. Their efforts at a childwelfare justification are an unconvincing afterthought. Viewed from a
children’s-rights perspective, because a fundamental right is at stake, the
degree of deference due is less. They should be judged by a professional
judgment standard.142 In Philadelphia, DHS had ample concrete evidence
141
142

Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 25, at 9–10.
See Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 1992)
(applying professional judgment standard to public agency’s choice and inadequate oversight of
foster placement); T.M. ex rel. R.T. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D. Wyo. 2000) (same);
Brian A. ex rel. Brooks v. Sundquist, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941, 954 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (applying same
standard to agency’s carrying out of a variety of responsibilities); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.
Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d sub nom. LaShawn A. by Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (same); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 858-59 (Wash. 2003) (en banc)
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that CSS made a large and very valuable contribution to the agency’s true
mission of serving foster children. Against that, it had mere speculation
about same-sex couples being discouraged from becoming foster parents. A
professional administrator truly devoted to children’s welfare would not have
concluded from this evidence that the agency should exclude CSS.
Government money should not be used to pay for
discrimination:143 First, it is not. No private agency gets paid for turning
applicants away, nor do private agencies receive a lump sum for simply being
in the foster care business.144 In fact, they do not, strictly speaking, get paid
for their foster-parent recruiting efforts at all. The public agency pays a
private agency for all or part the cost of taking a child into its care and then
overseeing the foster home.145 And to the extent excluding same-sex couples
is economically irrational, meaning it raises the private agency’s cost of
recruiting foster parents, that agency internalizes that cost. In addition, by
cutting itself off from a valuable segment of the foster-parent supply pool,
such a private agency makes it easier/less costly for other agencies to recruit
good candidates for fostering; a discriminating agency takes itself out of the
competition for those candidates it excludes on grounds not relevant to
qualification. More importantly, however, as noted above, that the state uses
public funds to carry out its parens patriae functions does not give rise to any
right on the part of third parties to complain; in that role, the state owes no
duties to any group of applicants for foster care not to subsidize a practice of
discriminating against them.

143
144

145

(adopting professional judgment standard and noting that although several other federal courts
have applied a “deliberate indifference” standard, “[s]everal of the federal courts explicitly qualified
that they were not deciding the standard for injunctive relief, or that they had not been asked to
consider a professional judgment standard”), id. at 859 (“[W]e hold that ‘deliberate indifference’ is
not well suited for analyzing the claims of the class. Foster children are entitled to a high standard.”).
Brief of Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al., supra note 85, at 17; Brief of Children’s Rts. et al., supra note
29, at 16.
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. 661, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2018); M.C.L.A. 722.124e(h)
(“[A] private child placing agency does not receive public funding with respect to a particular child
or particular individuals referred by the department unless that agency affirmatively accepts the
referral”).
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2019); Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F.
Supp. 3d 706, 715 (D. Mich. 2018) (“[A]fter an agency accepts a child’s case from DHHS, it
immediately begins receiving per diem compensation from the State.”), 746–47. The state might
well have determined the amount it would pay, however, by taking into account agencies’
recruitment costs.
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LGBTQ+ youth are harmed by licensing a biased private
agency:146 If, as explained above, a religious foster care agency increases
the overall size of the foster-home pool despite a policy against recruiting
same-sex couples, there is no purchase to an argument that accommodating
its religious beliefs harms LGBTQ+ youth by reducing the overall supply of
foster homes. In addition, the briefs filed in Fulton suggest by their silence
that there is no evidentiary basis for believing any of the foster parents
Catholic agencies recruit would be disposed to reject or otherwise harm
LGBTQ+ youth who end up in their care.147
Moreover, even if there were basis for that concern, the public agency
would, unless it is completely incompetent, not assign such youth to the
Catholic agency following their entry into foster care. Children come to the
attention of the child welfare system as a result of a report of abuse or neglect
to a hotline.148 Hotline workers elicit as much information they can about
what happened and why. If they deem a report valid—that is, stating facts
that, if true, fall within the state’s definition of maltreatment, they pass all
information received to caseworkers. Federal law mandates that at that point
caseworkers make “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal of the child from
146

147

148

Brief of Fosterclub & Former Foster Youth at 5, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868
(2020) (No. 19-123) (“[T]urning away qualified LGBTQ+ families creates serious stigma and
psychic harm not just for those families, but also LGBTQ+ foster youth”); Brief of Children’s Rts.
et al., supra note 29, at 16 (“Requiring the City contractually to allow agencies to discriminate based
on sexual orientation would also send a harmful message to vulnerable children in foster care—as
well as potential LGBTQ foster parents—that the City will not protect them from discrimination.”);
id., at 30-31 (“[I]t would also harm LGBTQ youth in foster care by sending a message that LGBTQ
people are considered unsuitable to provide loving homes. The rejection same-sex couples suffer
when being turned away from a foster care agency trickles down to LGBTQ youth and perpetuates
a cycle of stigmatic harm.”).
Cf. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 102, at 5 (“CSS Section 3.21 permits discretionary
‘exception[s]’ from the requirement ‘not to reject a child or family’ based upon ‘their actual or
perceived race, ethnicity, color, sex, [or] sexual orientation.’”); Pl. Catholic Charities’ Mot. Prelim.
Inj. 3, Catholic Charities v. Mich. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 2:19-CV-11661-DPH-DRG
(E.D. Mich.) (“Catholic Charities ministers to over 21,000 individuals each year without regard to
race, religion, sex, marital status, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected
characteristic.”); U.S. Catholics Open to Non-Traditional Families, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://www.pewforum.org/2015/09/02/u-s-catholics-open-to-non-traditional-families
[https://perma.cc/W8QJ-A9JT] (“[F]ully two-thirds of American Catholics think it is acceptable
for same-sex couples to raise children, including 43% who say a gay or lesbian couple with children
is just as good as any other kind of family.”); Frank Newport, LGBT Population in U.S. Significantly
Less Religious, GALLUP (Aug. 11, 2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/174788/lgbt-populationsignificantly-less-religious.aspx [https://perma.cc/BPC4-ZUWW] (finding 20% of the American
LGBTQ community identifies as Catholic).
For elaboration of the process described here and the underlying legal mandates, see Richard J.
Gelles, The Child Protection System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW
(James G. Dwyer ed.) (2020), 393–414.
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the home. To do that, they must learn all they can about the child’s situation
and about the underlying cause of the maltreatment. The 2018 Family First
Act places renewed emphasis on this process and enables states to tap into
more federal funding to do so. To remove a child from a home after making
reasonable efforts, caseworkers must substantiate the allegations in the report
by conducting an investigation and relate all the information they have
collected to a court in order to get a judge to approve the removal and grant
legal custody to the public agency. The agency would then do a specialneeds assessment to determine an appropriate placement. If in the course of
this entire process, public agency employees fail to recognize youths who selfidentify as LGBTQ+ or whose family members regard them as such, they
should be fired. And when they do recognize it, they should be informing
the private foster care agencies of that fact and asking them which of their
foster parents are especially well prepared to give those youths the positive
nurturing they need, just as they do with other special needs. This is not
rocket science.
Also worth noting: Implicit in this argument is an implausible assumption
that all families other agencies recruit are accepting of sexual minorities,
simply because the agencies agreed to sign the non-discrimination pledge.149
The amicus brief filed by “Fosterclub and Former Foster Youth” mostly
relates stories of gay youth who suffered terribly in foster homes because of
their sexual orientation; tellingly, none indicated that those homes were
operated by Catholic agencies. There is no evidence in the record of Fulton
or the other foster care cases that have been percolating in federal courts that
other private agencies try to exclude applicants who are uncomfortable or
worse with respect to a youth who is gay.150 If agencies did that it would
raise a different and more genuine problem regarding the size of the pool;
undoubtedly, that would dramatically reduce the total number of foster
homes. Taken to its logical conclusion, the normative position LGBTQ+
advocates advance--that discrimination against sexual minorities must be
eliminated from the foster care system, and that the City should not direct
any foster-care dollars to anyone with negative attitudes toward sexual
minorities--would mean making a LGBTQ+-friendly attitude a prerequisite
149
150

Cf. Sarah Warbelow, LGBT Youth Legal Landscape, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 413, 427 (2014)
(“Only 9 percent of foster families surveyed said they would accept LGBT youth.”).
Pennsylvania’s amicus brief states foster care agencies are directed to assess “a prospective foster
parent’s ability to provide care and nurturing to a child,” but does not indicate whether attitudes
regarding sexual orientation are a part of this assessment. Brief of Amicus Curiae Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania in Support of Respondents at 3, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868
(2020) (No. 19-123).
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for anyone to be approved as a foster parent. That might well cut the number
of available foster homes by a third or more. Extending the underlying
premise to other discriminatory attitudes (racism, sexism, religious bigotry,
hostility to atheists, etc.)—in short, making all agencies and all foster parents
pass a test of liberal purity—would decimate the roster of foster families.
Faith-based agencies might naturally wonder why they are being singled out
for condemnation because they would not pass that test.
In addition to the baseless conjecture that Catholic agencies’
participation diminishes the supply of foster homes, and the unwarranted
implicit assumption that all homes prepared by a Catholic agency are
homophobic whereas all homes prepared by other private and public
agencies are LGBTQ+-friendly, advocates for LGBTQ+ youth make
implausible claims about psychological harm to youth arising from the state
simply having a contract with an agency that discriminates. They offer no
factual support for the supposition that youth who end up in a good
placement through some other agency are somehow aware of and impacted
by the Catholic agency’s policy.151 Do they imagine that caseworkers in
Philadelphia are, for no fathomable reason, telling children about CSS and
how horrible it is that there is this one foster care agency out there among
the dozens with which the City contracts that has this policy? Or that foster
parents are going out of their way to make sure children in their care are
aware of this phenomenon that is completely irrelevant to their lives?
Implausible speculations of this sort make those who raise the concern appear
motivated by ideological commitment to the gay rights cause more so than
by genuine concern for children’s welfare.152 It is a pervasive problem in
child-welfare policy that people and organizations with adult-centered
agendas endeavor to disguise their primary objective by straining to translate
151

152

See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 27, at 49 n.16 (“[P]ermitting CSS’s policy
would send a ‘very strong signal to . . . [LGBTQ foster] youth that while we support you now, we
won’t support your rights as an adult.’”); Brief of Children’s Rts. et al., supra note 29, at 31 (“Forcing
the City to allow agencies to discriminate would send a loud and powerful message that LGBTQ
people are not valued and that the City is unable to protect them from discrimination. That
dangerous message will undoubtedly make LGBTQ youth fearful of coming out, of realizing their
identity, and of being rejected by the very providers on whom they depend.”); Brief Amici Curiae
of Scholars of Const. Rights & Int. of Children at 16–17, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct.
1868 (2020) (No. 19-123) (“[W]hen discrimination against same-sex couples occurs in the context
of the public child welfare system—a government program—it sends a message that stigmatizes
and humiliates LGBT foster children . . . [and] exacerbate[s] the psychic trauma that many LGBT
foster children already carry with them.”).
Cf. Brief of Scholars of Const. Rts. & Int. of Child., supra note 152, at 22 (“This Court has drawn
‘upon principles of liberty and equality to define and protect the rights of gays and lesbians,’ and
their families. And it should do so here to protect same-sex couples . . . .”).
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their position into child-welfare terms, fabricating facts that serve their
agenda.153 The campaign to drive private agencies like CSS out of child
welfare systems appears to be, on the whole, just another instance of this.
CONCLUSION
Same-sex couples represent a wonderful source of much-needed foster
parents. So, too, do religious private foster care agencies, despite limitations
they might have as to whom they recruit. Any large-city foster care system
can easily and fully welcome them both. These controversies and conflicts
are entirely unnecessary, occasioned by a failure to understand the state’s
proper role in caring for children whom the state removes from their homes.
Neither litigants nor the innumerable amici in cases like Fulton have
squarely addressed the rights of the children and the demands of the parens
patriae role. Rather, most operate from the perspective that foster care is
simply another service the state provides to “the people,” like public
transportation or libraries.154 A fundamental reframing of these disputes is
needed. The government system for aiding abused and neglected children is
not a public accommodation, for reasons that go far beyond its selectivity.
Allowing its focus to shift to adults’ interests and the City’s image,
Philadelphia has treated instrumentally the fragile children in its custody,
betraying them. There is little chance the Supreme Court will ever see this
situation through a children’s-rights lens; it has rarely looked at child welfare
issues that way. But perhaps the gay community and other cities that use
private foster care agencies can be convinced to stop politicizing child
welfare.
The main point here is that treating such an important area of child
welfare as a battleground for adult rights is wrong. Whoever is left out of the
foster care system or feels stigmatized by the policies governing it, either
religious agencies because public accommodation laws are applied or samesex couples because religious agencies are given an exemption, should instead
153

154

See James G. Dwyer, The Most Dangerous Branch of Science? Reining in Rogue Research and Reckless
Experimentation in Social Services, 87 MO. L. REV. 1, 12–29 (2022); Elizabeth Bartholet, Contested Child
Protection Policies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW (James G. Dwyer ed.)
(2020), 415–429 (discussing the tension between parent-focused value systems and child-focused
value systems).
The brief of Generation Justice in Fulton does not develop an argument for children’s rights or
parens patriae decision making per se but presents a forceful child-centered perspective on the
conflict. See Brief of Generation Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Fulton v. City
of Philadelphia,
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challenge the government’s decision as a violation of children’s rights. Any
court contest should be resolved solely be reference to reliable evidence of
that decision’s impact on the quantity and quality of available foster homes
and on children’s welfare. A proper understanding of the state’s role when
it takes children from their homes and keeps them in custody compels this
approach.

